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ABSTRACT 
Traditional public choice theory postulates that interest group 
representation is primarily responsible for the passage of legislation in a 
variety of areas.  Intellectual property scholars have largely embraced 
public choice theory as accurately explaining the enactment of intellectual 
property laws, agreeing both that the general assumptions of the public 
choice model are met and that specific statutes bear the scars of the interest 
group negotiation process.  This Article contends that the reality of 
legislative enactment in patent law diverges from this conventional wisdom.  
Drawing on three case studies—the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, the Bayh-Dole Act, and the Hatch-Waxman Act—this Article argues 
that in actuality, legislative enactments in patent law occur along a 
spectrum of interest group representation.  In this space, laws are often 
passed where the relevant interest groups are unorganized or even 
nonexistent.  This Article goes on to inductively establish a set of factors 
that both seek to explain these cases and to distinguish them from copyright 
statutes, which often adhere quite closely to traditional public choice 
predictions.  Having suggested several factors and identified ways in which 
they provide testable hypotheses, the Article ultimately considers the 
implications of the analysis both for those wishing to enact statutes that 
would alter patent rights and for scholars of public choice theory and 
intellectual property. 
                                                
* Academic Fellow, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and 
Bioethics at Harvard Law School.  J.D., 2013, Harvard Law School.  MPH, 2013, Harvard 
School of Public Health.  As a 2012–2013 John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at 
Harvard Law School, I acknowledge and am grateful for support from the School’s John 
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.  For their extremely thoughtful 
comments and suggestions in developing this paper, I would like to thank Terry Fisher, 
Peter Barton Hutt, Clarisa Long, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Melissa Wasserman, and 
attendees at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The various fields of intellectual property (IP) law have been 
marked by seemingly ever-increasing levels of protection.  The first United 
States Copyright Act, passed in 1790, conferred an initial protection term of 
fourteen years, with the potential for a fourteen-year extension where 
certain conditions were met.1  Over time, this protection grew sequentially 
to an initial twenty-eight year period subject to a fourteen-year renewal 
period,2 a twenty-eight-year period subject to a twenty-eight year renewal 
period,3 life of the author plus fifty years,4 and most recently, life of the 
author plus seventy years.5  Such increases in protection terms have also 
taken place in patent law, although the increases there have been much less 
frequent and dramatic.  The 1790 Patent Act provided for patent rights “for 
any term not exceeding fourteen years,”6 which was subsequently extended 
to seventeen years from the date of patent issuance7 and then to twenty 
                                                
1 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
2 Copyright Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831). 
3 Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1080–1081 (1909). 
4 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 302(a), (c), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (1976). 
5 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
6 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
7 Patent Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (1861). 
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years from the date of filing.8  Yet it is not simply the duration of 
intellectual property protection which has been extended.  Legislation has 
strengthened substantive rights, weakened affirmative defenses, and 
broadened the reach of remedies.  
On balance, such legislation is likely good for much of the regulated 
industry.  However, increasingly, such legislation may be bad for 
consumers, particularly where follow-on development of artistic and 
scientific works is needed or desired.  The copyright statute denies follow-
on creators a copyright in any work unlawfully using preexisting material,9 
and while patent law permits follow-on inventors to patent their 
improvements, the follow-on inventor cannot practice their invention 
without first obtaining a license from the original patentee (creating a 
“blocking patent” situation).10  Whether the need for and lack of such 
innovation present a problem worthy of intervention depends on the 
particular technological context, but in general the continued expansion of 
IP protections should give observers pause.  IP rights, by design, impose 
short-term costs on consumers for the sake of incentivizing future 
innovation.  But if the incremental social loss from granting a particular 
entitlement to holders of copyrights or patents exceeds the incremental 
reward they can reap, that entitlement should not be granted.11 
Yet consumers thus far seem relatively powerless12 to prevent the 
congressional enactment of various protectionist measures in intellectual 
property.  Scholars, particularly in their examinations of copyright statutes, 
have ascribed this result to the stranglehold the relevant interest groups have 
over the legislative process, arguing that IP legislation is a classic example 
of public choice theory in action.13  Further, they observe that protectionist 
measures in this area exhibit a “one-way ratchet” quality.14  That is, the 
                                                
8 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).  A more detailed account can be found in Tyler T. Ochoa, 
Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2001). Of course, this change only extends patent duration 
for patents whose pendency is less than three years.  
9 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in 
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has 
been used unlawfully.”). 
10 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 1009–10 (1997). 
11 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1813, 1829–30 (1984). 
12 For one notable recent counterexample, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.  
13 See infra note 51. 
14 See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional 
Foundations of the Public Domain, LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 
197. 
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protections provided in these statutes, once enacted, cannot feasibly be 
weakened through legislative means.15  Where prospects for legislative 
change are bleak, opponents of increasingly restrictive intellectual property 
laws may turn to voluntary private ordering schemes like Creative 
Commons or patent pools, but these by necessity will have a smaller 
absolute effect than would the repeal of protectionist legislation. 
But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong?  What if public 
choice theory can only explain the continued passage of increasingly 
protective IP legislation in the copyright area, but it lacks applicability in 
the context of patents?  In some ways, the resulting picture would appear 
even worse for would-be patent reformers, as the prospect that protectionist 
statutes are being enacted even without the vigorous support of the 
regulated industry might seem to pose an even greater hurdle to legislative 
action in the opposite direction.  But in other ways, such a challenge to the 
conventional wisdom would suggest that there exist open avenues for 
legislative involvement where none were previously thought to exist.  If 
there is room for motivated consumer groups to actually impact the 
legislative process, patent reformers might be able to achieve their goals 
through legislation after all.  Indeed, they might even be able to overcome 
the one-way ratchet problem.  
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides background on 
public choice theory, paying specific attention to the interest group branch 
of the theory and the ways in which it has been applied to explain 
legislation in the intellectual property arena.  Part I concludes that, despite 
some work to the contrary, public choice theory remains the accepted 
descriptive explanation for the enactment of intellectual property legislation 
of all kinds, including patent law.  Part II then considers three case studies: 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the Bayh-Dole Act, and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  This Part seeks to rebut the conventional wisdom in 
this area, demonstrating that although standard public choice theory does 
provide rational explanations for the enactment of each of these statutes, the 
factual history surrounding their enactment does not support the theoretical 
account.  That is, the traditional version of public choice theory does not 
necessarily hold in the patent context.   
                                                
15 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002) 
(“Recently, copyright legislation has seemed to be a one-way ratchet, increasing the subject 
matter, scope, and duration of copyright with every amendment.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy 
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 
YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) (“Legally, then, copyright has been a one-way ratchet, covering 
more works and granting more rights for a longer time.”). 
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Yet the goal of this paper is not so much to discredit the 
conventional approach as it is to refine the standard public choice analytic 
in light of the variables observed in the three case studies and to sketch the 
outlines of a taxonomy of interest group representation that might be useful 
in other areas of law.  Part III thus considers the descriptive accounts of 
legislation presented in Part II and begins to establish inductively a set of 
factors that seek both to explain these cases and to distinguish them from 
statutes enacted in the copyright context, in which a more extreme version 
of public choice theory operates.  Having identified a number of factors and 
examined ways in which they might provide testable hypotheses, Part III 
considers the implications of the preceding argument for scholars as well as 
for activists who seek to enact patent reform proposals of various types.  
Part IV concludes.  
I. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
This Part first provides a brief overview of public choice theory, 
specifically focusing on the branch of public choice theory referred to as 
interest group theory and its relationship to the causes and sources of 
legislative enactments.  This Part will then go on to consider the ways in 
which the existing intellectual property literature has applied public choice 
theory to explain congressional action in the intellectual property area. 
A. Public Choice Theory and the Causes of Legislation 
The central thesis of public choice theory as it regards the enactment 
of legislation can be stated quite simply: “statute[s] represent private rather 
than public interests, because of the undue influence of special interest 
groups.”16  Starting from the proposition that “legislation is a good 
demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative protection 
flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of 
overall social welfare,”17 public choice theory endeavors to provide a 
descriptive explanation of both how and when such interest groups are able 
to control the political process.  Public choice theory is therefore formally 
agnostic about whether such interest group control is “good” or “bad,” from 
                                                
16 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 1 (1991).  
17 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).  
5
Sachs: The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 344 (2014)  2013-2014  
349 
a normative perspective,18 although admittedly “[m]uch of the literature on 
interest groups conveys a strong flavor of disapproval.”19 
The theory of collective action as articulated by Professor Mancur 
Olson provides the logical linchpin for the explanation of interest group 
power.  Olson’s argument is as follows:  Because the general benefits of 
legislative action (such as the enactment of statutes building interstate 
highways) redound to the general population, any one person’s attempt to 
influence such legislative action will typically have a minute effect.  Where 
the benefits of legislative action are diffuse in this way, economically 
rational individuals can be expected to “free ride” on the activist efforts of 
others.  Due to this free rider problem, individuals benefiting from these 
broadly diffused public goods will have great difficulty identifying each 
other and coming together to advocate for such legislation.  However, a 
small, identifiable group with a concentrated, defined interest will face no 
such difficulties coming together.  Thus, legislative activity will be 
dominated by comparatively small interest groups with members who 
would reap a disproportionate share of any legislated benefit, while the 
costs of such legislation are dispersed far more widely.20  These small 
groups may therefore levy far greater political power than the “large groups 
. . . normally supposed to prevail in a democracy.”21 
This branch of public choice theory may have implications beyond 
the enactment of legislation.  For instance, influential scholars and judges 
have argued that public choice theory justifies stricter judicial review of 
statutes that result from interest-group pressure.22  Relatedly, Professor 
William Eskridge and others have argued that where a given statute displays 
                                                
18 Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 339 (1988). 
19 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 33. 
20 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 128 (1965); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 292 (1965) (“[A]ctivities may be approved which cause benefits to 
accrue to selected individuals and groups but which impose costs generally on all members 
of the community.”); Posner, supra note 17, at 266 (“[T]he literature concludes that 
effective interest groups are usually small and directed toward a single issue. The benefits 
of a redistribution in their favor are concentrated, the costs of organizing the group are 
small, and the costs of the redistribution are so widely diffused that nobody has much 
incentive to oppose it.”). 
21 OLSON, supra note 20, at 128. 
22 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court 
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 51–54 (1984) (presenting a form of review 
grounded in antitrust law for relevant statutes); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985) (proposing “strengthened rationality 
review” in order to “ensure that representatives have exercised some form of judgment 
instead of responding mechanically to interest-group pressures”).   
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the classic public choice theory pattern—where its benefits are concentrated 
among a small group but its costs are diffused over a wide population—
judges ought to interpret the statute narrowly and “refuse to provide special 
benefits unless clearly required by statute.”23  Professor Einer Elhauge has 
rejected both such arguments, however, concluding that “interest group 
theory provides no persuasive grounds to alter whatever conclusions one 
would otherwise reach about judicial lawmaking authority.”24  Public 
choice theory has also been applied to agency behavior, with “agency 
capture” serving as another application of the theory.25 
Of course, the “strong” version of public choice theory, in which all 
statutes are justified on pure interest group grounds,26 has rightfully been 
subject to challenge.  Judge Abner Mikva, recalling his five terms in the 
Illinois state legislature and additional five terms in the United States House 
of Representatives,27 argued that “the motivations of politicians are far too 
mixed to be understood through the generalizations” made by public choice 
theory.28  Empirical research has borne this out, noting that other factors 
like “ideology—beliefs about the public interest—do[] indeed influence 
congressional votes.”29  Public choice theory also fails to account for 
                                                
23 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 299 tbl.2 (1988); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989) 
(suggesting the requirement of a “clear statement before courts will construe statutes as 
amounting to naked wealth transfers”). 
24 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 48 (1991). 
25 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1795–
96 (2011) (“[T]he regulated interests are concentrated and able to bring significant 
resources to bear to ensure that the policies the regulator enacts suit their interests. 
Countervailing forces, meanwhile, tend to be diffuse and less able to exert significant 
influence. The result is that agency policy systemically tilts toward the interests of the 
regulated entities.”). 
26 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 7.  
27 Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 
167, 167 (1988). 
28 Id. at 169; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 2 (describing Judge Mikva’s 
Foreword and noting that “not even five terms in that notorious den of iniquity, the Illinois 
state legislature, had prepared [Mikva] for the political villainy depicted in the public 
choice literature”); RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973) (articulating 
the three basic goals of a legislator: achieving reelection, gaining power in their house of 
Congress, and enacting good laws). 
29 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 7; Elhauge, supra note 24, at 43 (“These scholars 
convincingly demonstrate that noneconomic factors such as altruism and ideology play at 
least some role in political participation and decisionmaking”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1035, 1067 (2003) (“[I]deology, as well as a desire to advance the public interest, no 
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precisely how these interest groups are supposed to control legislators, 
given the well-known problems articulated in the literature on principal-
agent theory.30  And perhaps most glaringly, the strong version of the 
interest group theory fails to explain the existence of “economy-wide 
legislation” that imparts diffuse benefits to all citizens.31  Thus, it must be 
true that interest group theory “cannot offer a complete theory of 
regulation.”32 
Yet even given these critiques of the theory, public choice theory 
retains great descriptive power in explaining wide swathes of existing 
legislation.  The now-seminal study by Kay Schlozman and John Tierney, 
even while admitting that “the government is not some anemometer 
measuring the force of the prevailing organized interest breezes,”33 found 
that the effect of interest group pressure on Congress could “range from 
insignificant to determinative,” depending on “the configuration of a large 
number of factors—among them the nature of the issue, the nature of the 
demand, the structure of political competition, and the distribution of 
resources.”34  For instance, interest group influence is likely to be quite 
strong where “the group’s goals are narrow and have low visibility.”35  
Similarly, where legislation is “applicable to a particular industry,” interest 
group theory likely has comparatively greater explanatory power.36  
Ultimately, the “best picture of the political process” is one in which 
“constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all influence 
legislative conduct,” and the relative weights of these factors in a given 
situation determine the level of interest group influence.37 
                                                                                                                       
doubt influences the actions of many political actors.”).  But see OLSON, supra note 20, at 
162 (“There is to be sure always some ideologically oriented behavior in any society . . . . 
Yet it is striking how relatively minor the ideological sacrifices for the political parties in 
the United States are.”).  
30 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 27; see also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, 
Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 282–84 
(1984). 
31 Posner, supra note 17, at 272; see Elhauge, supra note 24, at 43 (“[T]the preferences of 
regulators and the general public sometimes prevail over the preferences of interest 
groups.”). 
32 Elhauge, supra note 24, at 43.  
33 KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 402 (1986). 
34 Id. at 317. 
35 FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 19.  
36 Posner, supra note 17, at 271. 
37 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 873, 900–01 (1987); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 16, at 33 (arguing that a 
theory postulating “(1) that reelection is an important motive of legislators, (2) that 
constituent and contributor interests thereby influence legislators, and (3) that small, easily 
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B. Existing Scholarship Applying Public Choice Theory to 
Intellectual Property 
As an initial matter, scholars generally agree that the conditions of 
public choice theory are met in the intellectual property context.  
Specifically, the benefits of IP-strengthening legislation38 are typically 
concentrated in a few interest groups or stakeholders with the greatest 
motivation to act, while the costs of the legislation are diffused both over a 
given population and often over multiple generations.39  Thus there is, in 
general, a “systematic imbalance in favor of the expansion and deepening of 
exclusive rights to information at the expense of the public domain”40 of the 
type likely to give rise to interest group-driven legislation.  At least some 
scholars believe that, due to this imbalance, the rights provided by existing 
legislation will be excessive from a social welfare perspective.41 
Several scholars have focused specifically on the enactment of 
individual intellectual property laws, identifying the relevant interest groups 
and explaining their involvement in lobbying, drafting, and enacting 
statutes.  The majority of this scholarship has focused on copyright statutes.  
Professor Jessica Litman’s work on the 1976 Copyright Act as a 
                                                                                                                       
organized interest groups have an influence disproportionate to the size of their 
membership” is “far more supportable than the strong version”); Elhauge, supra note 24, at 
43; Rai, supra note 29, at 1067–68. 
38 Of course, in the patent context, much of the expansion of rights can be more directly 
traced to the Federal Circuit. Yet because the Federal Circuit itself is the product of a 
statute—a statute explicitly designed to increase the protections provided to patentees—
legislative enactments remain a critical focus of study.  
39 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2004) (noting the “inherent asymmetry between the 
value that creators of intellectual property place on having property rights and the value 
that would-be copiers place on the freedom to copy without having to obtain a license”); 
Benkler, supra note 14, at 196 (“[T]he benefits of such rights are clearly seen by, and 
expressed by, well-defined interest holders that exist at the time the legislation is passed. In 
contrast, most of the social costs—which are economic, social, political, and moral—are 
diffuse and likely to be experienced in the future by parties not yet aware of the fact that 
they will be affected by the extension of rights.”); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000).  
40 Benkler, supra note 14, at 196. 
41 See id. at 198 (“[T]he political economy of legislation is such that the legislature will 
systematically tend to create exclusive rights beyond what is economically efficient, as 
well as beyond what gives proper consideration to the implications of these rights for 
democracy and autonomy.”); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: 
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 813, 871 (2001) (“Copyright today goes much further than the public interest requires 
. . . .”).  
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demonstration of the “process of drafting copyright statutes through 
negotiations among industry representatives”42 is by now canonical.  In fact, 
the involvement of interest groups in the 1976 statute may even go beyond 
most forms of involvement in the legislative process postulated by public 
choice theorists.  As Litman notes, “most of the statutory language was not 
drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language 
evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and 
other parties with economic interests in the property rights the statute 
defines.”43  Litman has told a similar story in the context of the more recent 
1998 enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).44  
Professor Robert Merges has emphasized the interest group lobbying behind 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, noting the 
“absence of effective lobbying against the Act.”45  Justice Stephen Breyer, 
dissenting in Golan v. Holder,46 similarly noted that in enacting § 514 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which restored the United States 
copyrights in millions of preexisting works formerly in the public domain, 
“Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony only from the 
representatives of existing copyright holders.”47  
Many scholars have made similar arguments in the patent arena.48 
They argue that, according to “public choice theory . . . each new 
                                                
42 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 
275, 282 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Technological Change]; see generally id.; Jessica D. 
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) 
[hereinafter Litman, Legislative History]. 
43 Litman, Legislative History, supra note 42, at 860–61; see also Lunney, supra note 41, at 
898 (“Ordinary consumers seldom play any direct role in the extended (and often private) 
negotiating sessions required to craft such compromises. The consumer interest is 
represented only indirectly in these sessions, when it happens to coincide with the interest 
of one of the participants. Such coincidences are rare.”); William F. Patry, Copyright and 
the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 
(1996) (“In my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members 
of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their legislation and their 
committee report.”). 
44 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144–45 (2001) (“There is no overarching vision 
of the public interest animating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. None. Instead, what 
we have is what a variety of different private parties were able to extract from each other in 
the course of an incredibly complicated four-year multiparty negotiation.”); see also 
Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 590–602 
(2006). 
45 Merges, supra note 39, at 2236–37. 
46 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).  
47 Id. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
48 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups 
in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 
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amendment to the patent statute represents an opportunity for 
counterproductive special interest lobbying,”49 and that “a lack of general 
familiarity with the specialized issues raised by patent law may intensify the 
room for capture by special interest groups.”50  Still other scholars speak of 
public choice theory in the context of intellectual property statutes more 
broadly, suggesting that they may view copyright and patent law as similar 
in this regard, embracing public choice theory as providing an accurate 
descriptive explanation for the congressional enactment of IP laws.51   
Not all scholars agree that the traditional public choice theory 
account holds today.  Professor Amy Kapczynski has described an 
“emerging countermobilization”52 to the strengthening of IP rights.  In her 
view, even in its presently nascent form, this countermobilization has 
already had “a significant impact on IP law.”53  She provides as examples 
the “successes of the access-to-medicines campaign in obtaining an 
amendment to TRIPS54 and bringing down the prices of HIV/AIDS 
medicines; the success of free-software programmers in preventing the 
codification of software patents in Europe; and the expansive growth of the 
private ordering schemes introduced by proponents of free software and the 
                                                                                                                       
145 (2011) (“Using public choice theory, we argue that patent law is best understood by 
focusing on the choice of institutions made by interest groups in their efforts to alter the 
law.”). 
49 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1637 (2003). 
50 Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 501, 526 (2010). 
51 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics 
of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 820 (2008) (“The most widely accepted 
explanation for [the strengthening of IP since the mid-1970s] is derived from public choice 
theory.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000) (“Congress in recent years seems to have abdicated its role in 
setting intellectual property policy to the private interests who appear before it.”); Robert P. 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1857, 1875 (2000) (noting the “broad consensus that industry groups have unusually 
broad input into the drafting of IPR-related legislation”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. 
Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 112–13 (2010) (“[P]ublic choice theory 
explains how and why agencies set up to regulate a certain industry or economic sector will 
sometimes act to advance the narrow interests of the regulated industry or sector. This 
problem is omnipresent, and there are reasons to believe that it is especially acute in the 
intellectual property context.” (footnote omitted)).   
52 Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 820. 
53 Id. at 836. 
54 TRIPS, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, is a WTO 
treaty providing minimum IP standards across a wide range of subject matters for the 
nations that are WTO members.  
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Creative Commons.”55  Kapczynski’s arguments seem even more powerful 
in light of more recent developments, such as the consumer movements that 
succeeded in halting the progression of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) 
and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) through Congress in early 2012.56   
Yet for every consumer movement that eventually succeeds in 
preventing the enactment of more restrictive IP laws, there are opposing 
examples of swift interest group action to halt proposed reform efforts.57  
The story in late 2012 of the Republican Study Committee’s (RSC) memo, 
Three Myths About Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It,58 is one 
example.  The memo, written by then-RSC staffer Derek Khanna, argued 
that the current copyright law “destroys entire markets”59 in many ways, 
including by “[h]ampering scientific inquiry,” “[s]tifling the creation of a 
public library,” “[d]iscouraging added-value industries,” and “[p]enaliz[ing] 
legitimate journalism and oversight.”60  The memo advocated a number of 
policy solutions to these identified problems, including reforming 
copyright’s existing statutory damages regime,61 expanding the fair use 
defense,62 and even limiting copyright terms.63  Within hours of posting the 
memo to its website, however, the RSC pulled the document, and news 
outlets soon reported that industry lobbyists were responsible for the flip-
flop.64  Khanna was subsequently fired.65   
                                                
55 Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 836.   
56 Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals on 
Where We Go from Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://techpresident.com/news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegauplaod-and-four-
proposals-where-we-go-here.  Of course, the movement was surely familiar to the scholars 
who argued against the “White Paper” in the mid-1990s.  See William W. Fisher III, The 
Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States 
24–25, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf.  
57 Cf. Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for 
Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2651 (1994) (“Intellectual property reform 
is particularly dominated by interest group politics.”). 
58 Derek S. Khanna, Three Myths About Copyright Law and Where to Start to Fix It, 
REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM. (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/113633834/Republican-Study-Committee-Intellectual-
Property-Brief. 
59 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). 
60 Id. at 4–6. 
61 The statutory damages regime is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
62 The existing fair use defense is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
63 See Khanna, supra note 58 at 7–8.  
64 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Influential GOP Group Releases, Pulls Shockingly Sensible 
Copyright Memo, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 18, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/11/influential-gop-group-releases-shockingly-sensible-copyright-memo; Mike 
Masnick, That Was Fast: Hollywood Already Browbeat the Republicans into Retracting 
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Further, none of Kapczynski’s examples as articulated above are 
precisely targeted to the situation presented here: legislative enactments in 
the IP space.66  It is certainly possible that consumer groups are gaining in 
their ability to prevent the enactment of interest group legislation, or to 
establish private ordering schemes like Creative Commons to mitigate the 
worst consequences of IP-protectionist legislation.  But the field of 
intellectual property has not yet witnessed a serious, sustained effort to pass 
legislation that would walk back various intellectual property protections, 
whether it would do so by weakening substantive rights, by strengthening 
affirmative defenses, or by limiting remedies for infringement.  Many 
scholars have expressed skepticism that we will ever see such an effort.67  
As such, the prevailing wisdom in the IP space remains very much a story 
of interest group control over the legislative process.68  
                                                                                                                       
Report on Copyright Reform, TECHDIRT (Nov. 17, 2012, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121117/16492521084/hollywood-lobbyists-have-busy-
saturday-convince-gop-to-retract-copyright-reform-brief.shtml. 
65 Timothy B. Lee, Staffer Axed by Republican Group over Retracted Copyright-Reform 
Memo, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/12/staffer-axed-by-republican-group-over-retracted-copyright-reform-memo. 
66 For example, the discussed Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement was intended to 
broaden developing countries’ abilities to employ compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, 
but many developing countries have signed free-trade agreements (FTAs) with the United 
States in which they bargain away their ability to take advantage of this Amendment. Too 
often, even when countries manage to issue compulsory licenses, they experience some 
form of retaliation from the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., Anthony D. So & Rachel 
Sachs, Making Intellectual Property Work for Global Health, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 
106, 113 (2012) (“Abbott retaliated to Thailand’s compulsory license on its drug 
lopinavir/ritonavir . . . by withdrawing seven pending applications for registration of new 
medicines from the Thai Food and Drug Administration. These withdrawals effectively 
withheld these seven drugs, which temporarily included the heat-stable version of Kaletra, 
from the Thai market.”). 
67 See Benkler, supra note 14, at 196 (“[I]t is never the case that the diffuse and future users 
will band together to expand fair use. Even if they were to band together, it is impossible 
that copyright owners would remain unaware of the initiative and fail to offer substantial 
opposition in the legislative process.”). 
68 As in the more general literature regarding public choice theory, scholars have discussed 
the potential extensions of these arguments into related fields, such as agency capture.  See, 
e.g., Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 51, at 113 (2010) (“[T]he content industry 
exercises enormous influence over the legislative process, leading Congress to pass 
unbalanced legislation that favors the interests of the content industry over that of the 
public at large. There is no reason to believe that the content industry will not similarly 
influence an administrative body established to regulate it.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Rai, supra note 29, at 1066–67 (describing various channels through which interest groups 
might seek to influence regulators).  
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The next Part of this Article will challenge the veracity of this 
conventional wisdom as it pertains to statutes passed in the patent law 
space, arguing that not only do the postulates of public choice theory not 
always apply to enacted legislation in that area, but also that there is a 
spectrum or taxonomy of organizational relationships that may operate 
instead.   
II. A TAXONOMY OF INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATION 
This Part will consider three case studies in the field of patent 
legislation—the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,69 the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980,70 and the Hatch-Waxman Act of 198471—in order to examine 
the veracity of the conventional wisdom regarding public choice theory’s 
descriptive power in the patent law context.  Within each case, this Part will 
provide a brief historical overview of the enactment of the statute and, in 
the course of doing so, will focus primarily on identifying the relevant 
interest group or groups and the role (if any) they played in the enactment 
of the statute.   
The analysis in this Part seeks to establish two main claims.  First, 
public choice theory is inadequate as a descriptive explanation for several 
important statutes in patent law.  Among these three cases, only the history 
behind the Hatch-Waxman Act resembles the circumstances predicted by 
public choice theory, and even in that case there are complicating factors 
regarding interest group alignment.  Second, not only is public choice 
theory inadequate as a descriptive explanation of such legislation, but 
further, the character of legislative enactments is far from binary (in other 
words, far from a situation where public choice theory either explains the 
behavior or it does not).  That is, there is a spectrum or taxonomy of 
potential relationships between interest groups and the government, and 
sometimes even between opposing interest groups.  Statutory histories may 
thus be most appropriately viewed as reflecting more or fewer public choice 
theory elements, rather than simply fitting within the mold of the theory or 
not.  These additional insights help inform the standard public choice theory 
analytic. 
                                                
69 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, & 50 
U.S.C.). 
70 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).  
71 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 21, 15, & 35 U.S.C.).  
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As this Article only examines three statutes in detail,72 its attempt to 
inductively establish such a taxonomy is, by necessity, imprecise.  
However, taken together, these three statutes strongly suggest that there are 
at least two dimensions of the taxonomy to consider.  The first is the 
presence or absence of a regulated interest group.  Here, I use the terms 
“presence” or “absence” in a way that is tied to general circumstances in the 
world rather than to the specific circumstances of the statute.  That is, if a 
law is responsible for the creation of an industry or specific stakeholder 
group, then that group is “absent” at the time of its creation.  For instance, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)73 establishes a new 
service delivery model known as the accountable care organization (ACO).  
Because this delivery model was previously unknown, ACOs were “absent” 
for the passage of the ACA.  Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry is 
“present” for statutes that are enacted today, even if the industry had no role 
to play in their enactment.   
The “absent” category within the taxonomy is an analytically useful 
one to include, as it has been understudied relative to its importance across 
varying areas of law.  The problem of the “invisible stakeholder” is present 
in many fields, but it has particularly been recognized in fields such as 
environmental law,74 health law,75 and the field of public health.76  
Essentially, the idea is that laws are often passed with either the goal or 
                                                
72 However, there are admittedly few other patent-related statutes to choose from.  The 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), was the first major overhaul of the patent 
regime since the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), and some of its provisions have only very recently 
taken effect.   
73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
74 See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 
317 (1985) (“[T]he surprisingly strong environmental statutes of the early 1970s were not 
passed in response to lobbying by well-organized national environmental groups; on the 
contrary, it is the other way around—the statutes of the early 1970s made it possible to 
consolidate national environmental groups.”).  
75 As noted above, the ACA’s creation of accountable care organizations is one such 
example. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 619 
(2011).   
76 Cf. Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: Population-Level Measures in a 
Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1607, 1608–09 (1997) 
(examining the use of individual-level healthcare interventions as compared to population-
level public health interventions that function to alter the existing choice architecture). 
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effect of incentivizing the development of certain stakeholders.77  But where 
those stakeholders are “absent” during the incubation and passage of the 
law—not merely uninvolved in the process, but not even existing in the 
world—the legislative process is inherently speculative in a way that is not 
true when the relevant interest group exists, but perhaps is uninvolved in the 
particular statute.  Sometimes the result is positive, and a helpful new 
technology or stakeholder group comes into existence.  Yet sometimes the 
law may have the unintended effect of stifling innovation or of 
hamstringing a group’s reform efforts.  In some respects, the analysis is 
similar to that of the often-discussed “future generations” problem.78 
The second dimension in play is situational, regarding the ways in 
which a given interest group relates to a particular proposed bill.  An 
interest group may be “present” in society, but it may also be disorganized 
and play little or no role in the enactment of a statute.  Or it may be very 
organized and extremely influential.  Alternatively, it may be present and 
well-organized, but in a way that pits it directly against another interest 
group, ultimately rendering it uninfluential.   
Because this second dimension is more heterogeneous than the first 
(presence or absence has more of a binary character), I will refrain from 
attempting to characterize the suggested taxonomy visually in this article 
(for instance, in a 2x2 matrix, or along a spectrum of involvement).  
However, the analysis herein is suggestive of a series of general 
conclusions, which will be explored in more detail in Part III.   
A. Absent: The Creation of the Court of Appeals for the  
Federal Circuit 
Today, it is difficult to imagine the United States’ system of patent 
law without the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the semi-
specialized appellate court whose jurisdiction is defined by subject matter, 
not geography.  The Federal Circuit hears all appeals from the United States 
District Courts in cases arising under the Patent Act as well as all appeals 
from several specialized Article I courts, including the Court of Federal 
                                                
77 See infra, part III.A; see also, e.g., Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (incentivizing physicians to expand 
their use of electronic medical records (EMRs), which should have the effect of 
incentivizing innovation in the EMR space). 
78 Cf. generally Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219 
(analyzing issues of intergenerational equity in copyright law). 
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Claims and the Merit Systems Protection Board.79  The court was created by 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), and its impact on the 
field has been far-reaching.80  Yet the history behind the FCIA reveals that 
the statute was not the product of interest group lobbying, although both the 
strong and weak forms of the interest group theory of legislation predict that 
it would have been susceptible to such pressure.   
The first congressional81 move toward the establishment of the 
FCIA was the creation of the 1972 Commission on Revision of the Federal 
Court Appellate System, which would come to be known as the Hruska 
Commission after its Chairman, Senator Roman Hruska.  The Commission 
conducted extensive fact-finding on a range of judiciary reform issues, 
concluding that broad conflicts among the laws of the circuits persisted 
across a range of subject matters, including patent law, and that there was a 
serious need to achieve national uniformity in these areas.82  The 
Commission’s vehicle of choice for addressing these conflicts was a 
National Court of Appeals, or a “Junior Supreme Court” (as it was called by 
its critics), on which circuit judges would sit on a revolving basis to screen 
cases before they arrived at the Supreme Court, resolving some conflicts 
                                                
79 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (providing jurisdiction over appeals “in any civil action 
arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory 
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents”); id. § 1295(a)(3) 
(providing jurisdiction over appeals “from a final decision of the United States Court of 
Federal Claims”); id. § 1295(a)(9) (providing jurisdiction over an appeal from a “final 
order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board”); see U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMM. ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S., THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, 1982–1990 at 
xii (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991) [hereinafter FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY]; Eric G. 
Bruggink, “Unfinished Business,” 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 879, 879 (2003). 
80 See infra notes 98–106 and accompanying text.  
81 In 1971, the judiciary had already begun thinking about related problems.  That year, 
then-Chief Justice Burger appointed a Study Group, chaired by Professor Paul Freund, to 
examine a range of problems plaguing the Supreme Court’s caseload—among them the 
great disparities and concomitant uncertainty in the law across circuits, as the Court was 
unable to review every developing split.  FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 
3.  The idea of a National Court of Appeals, so central to the recommendations of the 
Hruska Commission, came out of this Study Group.  Id. at 3–4.  For a detailed comparison 
of the Freund Proposal with the report of the Hruska Commission, Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ) proposal, and ultimate FCIA, see 
generally Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982—And Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 543 (1983).  
82 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 4.  
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and sending others to the Court.83  The Commission’s proposal, however, 
was not enacted into law.84 
Progress stagnated until 1977, when President Carter appointed 
Griffin Bell as Attorney General.85  Bell created the Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ), headed by Assistant 
Attorney General Daniel Meador.86  And, “[t]hrough research and wide-
ranging consultations with members of Congress, judges, government 
agencies, and practicing lawyers, [OIAJ] sought to find weak spots and 
inefficiencies in the system and to propose solutions.”87  In July 1978, 
Meador circulated a proposal that would have merged the Court of Claims 
and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to create a new circuit court 
with jurisdiction over cases within the purview of those two courts as well 
as “exclusive appellate jurisdiction in civil tax, environmental, and patent 
cases.”88  But Meador’s attempt to give his proposed court jurisdiction over 
tax and environmental cases was highly contentious, and these subjects 
were largely excised from the court’s jurisdiction before the final proposal 
was sent to Congress.89 
Senator Ted Kennedy, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, introduced into the Senate both the Administration’s proposal 
and his own similar bill.90  A “clean” version of the Senate bill passed with 
bipartisan support on October 30, 1979, but only with an additional 
amendment by Senator Dale Bumpers.  The Bumpers Amendment would 
have “reversed the judicial presumption in law that an agency rule or 
regulation was valid.”91  Subsequently, Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr., 
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, introduced a bill into 
that chamber, and it passed in the House in September 1980.  Yet the House 
bill did not contain the Bumpers Amendment and the House leadership was 
hostile to that provision.  The House never considered the Senate’s bill, and 
                                                
83 Id. at 3–4. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 Daniel J. Meador, Griffin Bell at the Intersection of Law and Politics: The Department of 
Justice, 1977–1979, 24 J.L. & POL. 529, 538 (2008). 
86 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 4. 
87 Meador, supra note 85, at 538. 
88 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 5. 
89 Id. The Federal Circuit does have jurisdiction over tax refund appeals, as a suit for 
money damages against the government, but it does not exercise jurisdiction over other tax 
cases. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 6. 
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as the Senate was unable to eliminate the Bumpers Amendment from the 
legislation, both bills died at the end of the 96th Congress.92   
After the election of President Reagan in 1980, there was great 
uncertainty regarding the prospects of judiciary reform.  Yet the enthusiasm 
for such bills increased in the 97th Congress, with the apparent support of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and thus movement toward 
passage of such bills accelerated.93  Senate and House bills proposed to 
create the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, adopting Meador’s 
general recommendation to merge the Court of Claims and the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals94 and to add additional jurisdiction over 
certain other areas of law.95  The bills passed their respective houses with 
wide bipartisan support,96 and in March 1982, the reconciled bill was 
presented to President Reagan for his signature.  The FCIA was signed into 
law on April 2, 1982.97 
Under the typical patent law account of the Federal Circuit’s 
creation, the court was intended to tackle two large problems.  The first and 
most obvious problem was the disuniformity in the application of patent law 
across the courts of appeals, which created a large incentive to engage in 
forum shopping.98  Businesses operating nationally “needed uniformity in 
interpretation of the patent laws in order to make decisions conducive to 
research and productivity.”99  The Supreme Court rarely accepted patent 
cases for review, and even if it had accepted such cases more frequently, it 
would have been practically impossible for the Court to resolve all such 
                                                
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 6–7.  
94 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 
36–39. 
95 See FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 7 (listing areas of jurisdiction).  
96 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 583 (2003). 
97 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 7–8. 
98 See id. at xi, 3; S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) 
(noting that the law’s “central purpose [was] to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity 
and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of patent law”); see 
also Haldane R. Mayer, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 20th 
Anniversary Judicial Conference: “A Salute to the Federal Circuit,” 217 F.R.D. 548, 560 
(2002) (remarks of Donald Dunner) (“Before 1982, there were tremendous attitudinal 
differences and other differences between the circuits. If you wanted to declare a patent 
invalid, you would go to the Eighth Circuit, which never saw a patent that it wanted to find 
valid. If you wanted a court that was more hospitable to patents, you would go to the 
Seventh Circuit, you would go to the Fifth Circuit, maybe the Sixth Circuit.”). 
99 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at xii. 
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disputes. 100  Second and relatedly, some of the circuit courts “tended not to 
give any deference to the administrative examination process and 
invalidated many patents” out of fears “about the dangers of monopoly” and 
“low regard for the expertise of the Patent Office.”101  Thus, not only was 
forum shopping rampant, but it had potentially great costs for patent 
holders, as the uncertainty in the field threatened to decrease incentives for 
innovation.  The Department of Justice Committee on Revision of the 
Federal Judicial System went so far as to describe the situation as a “crisis 
for litigants who seek justice, for claims of human rights, for the rule of law, 
and [] therefore a crisis for the Nation.”102  Retrospective views of the 
Federal Circuit generally agree that the creation of the court has solved the 
uniformity problem,103 although some scholars lament the proliferation of 
intra-Circuit splits or apparent panel-dependency of outcomes.104  And there 
is near-universal agreement that the Federal Circuit is more pro-patent than 
were the circuit courts prior to the FCIA,105 but there is disagreement both 
about the specific causes of this shift and about its normative desirability.106 
                                                
100 S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 3 (describing the Supreme Court as operating at or near “full 
capacity); see also S. Rep. No. 96-304, at 9 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 22. 
101 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 10.  
102 H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 17 (quoting REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1 (1977)).  
103 See FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at xiii (“A large portion of the work 
of a judge of the Federal Circuit is the review of draft opinions before issuance to ensure 
that intra-circuit conflicts are not created. Conflicts between our own decisions would 
defeat a major raison d’etre for the court’s creation.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989); 
Mayer, supra note 98, at 560 (remarks of Donald Dunner); Seamon, supra note 96, at 545. 
104 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 776 (2004) (presenting arguments to support 
“the concern that the court is not making fruitful attempts to achieve consensus”); Paul R. 
Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges 
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999) (noting the panel-dependency criticism, but 
ultimately contending that such complaints are “exaggerated”). 
105 See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2003) (“The Federal Circuit has 
further extended the Supreme Court's expansive approach to patent eligibility while 
relaxing the stringency of standards for patent protection, such as utility and 
nonobviousness.”); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
771, 794 (2003) (“Today it is quite clear that [at the Federal Circuit] . . . few innovations 
will fail to comprise patentable subject matter . . . .”).   
106 See Thomas, supra note 105, at 792–98 (noting the Federal Circuit’s preference for 
rules over standards in its “continuing drive for doctrinal stability within the patent law,” 
id. at 794, and the relationship of this preference to the observed phenomenon that 
specialized courts come to support their specialty). 
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The question remains, though, precisely how the FCIA was able to 
pass through the gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment, particularly 
where analogous bills and proposals before it had failed.  Theoretically, 
public choice theory might provide one possible explanation.  Specifically, 
given the two problems of disuniformity and antipathy that the Federal 
Circuit was designed to address, the essential conditions of even the weak 
version of public choice theory would seem to hold.  This is a case in which 
the regulated industry is likely to feel strongly about the issue and to present 
a united front in urging for the adoption of legislation, while at the same 
time the salience of the issue to the general population is likely to be low. 
To be sure, at least some assertions have been made that industry 
and the patent bar played roles throughout this process.  Federal Circuit 
Judge Marion Bennett, in recounting the history leading up to the FCIA’s 
adoption, asserts that Meador’s 1978 proposal received strong support from 
the patent community,107 and that the industry’s support for the FCIA 
intensified after President Reagan’s election.108  Further, the very fact that 
the FCIA was enacted with such a clear focus on the resulting court’s 
jurisdiction over patent cases may be thought of as additional evidence for 
industry’s involvement.  Specifically, the “structural defect” of 
disuniformity in patent law arose out of the “regional organization of the 
existing courts of appeals, none of whose decisions were binding on the 
others and only a small fraction of whose decisions were reviewed by the 
United States Supreme Court.”109  This “defect” is not unique to patent law, 
yet patent law is unique among areas of federal law in spawning such an 
involved reform movement.  Thus, it would seem that the second concern 
behind the Federal Circuit’s enactment—the animosity at the time of many 
circuit courts toward patents—may have provided the requisite additional 
impetus for the judiciary reform agenda.110  This is precisely the type of 
interest that would seem to suggest the behind-the-scenes involvement of 
the regulated industry.  
Yet there is no clear evidence that either industry or the patent bar 
organized itself and intervened in the legislative process to speed the 
enactment of the FCIA or to encourage the enactment of previous judicial 
                                                
107 FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, supra note 79, at 5.  
108 Id. at 6.  
109 Seamon, supra note 96, at 544.   
110 See id., at 568–69 (“[P]roponents of the FCIA argued that the inconsistency and 
uncertainty in patent law stifled industrial innovation. . . . [T]his extrajudicial effect struck 
a national nerve because of fear that the United States had lost its ‘competitiveness.’”). 
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reform efforts.111  Statements that industry, broadly speaking, merely 
supported the proposals do not rise to the level of involvement required to 
establish that industry was responsible for the enactment of the statute 
under the principles of public choice theory.  Statements made by patent 
lawyers, industry, and representatives thereof at the Senate and House 
hearings on the FCIA are closer but alone do not rise to the level of 
responsibility required under the theory.  Unlike in the copyright context, 
this is not a situation in which the regulated parties provided the statutory 
language, negotiated with each other throughout the process, or performed 
any other such task that would have driven the statute’s passage. 
Indeed, even the evidence that industry broadly supported the 
reform proposals should be qualified.  Daniel Meador’s painstaking account 
of his work in the years leading up to the enactment of the FCIA and 
subsequent establishment of the Federal Circuit notes that the 1979 
precursor to the FCIA was opposed by the “leaders of the Patent Law 
Association of Chicago and of the New York Patent Law Association.”112  
Apart from this reference and brief notes that patent lawyers and 
representatives from their particular bar associations were included in the 
multi-day hearings on the 1979 bills held by the Senate and House, 
Meador’s detailed history is tellingly devoid of any mention of industry’s 
involvement in the enactment of the FCIA.  Indeed, in Meador’s view, “had 
it not been for OIAJ there would today be no Federal Circuit,” as no other 
institution, including the bar, provided the requisite leadership.113 
Relatedly, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the real story 
is one of “congressional pioneering in the field of court structuring,”114 and 
that industry, even if it were involved in propelling the FCIA through 
Congress, was somewhat marginalized throughout the process.  The 
structure of the statute itself is one such example.  If industry had in fact 
been responsible for the enactment of the FCIA, we would expect to see a 
truly specialized court, focused entirely on patent law issues, rather than the 
semi-specialized court we see in reality.  The House Report on the FCIA 
specifically addressed this issue and recognized the greater potential for 
                                                
111 Even first-hand accounts arguing that industry played a key role in the development of 
the court recognize the divisions within industry and the opposition from segments of the 
bar.  See, e.g., Pauline Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 
FED. CIR. B.J. 541, 543 (2002).  But see, e.g., Paul Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit 
Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1456–58 (2012).  
112 Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. 
REV. 581, 595 (1992).  
113 Id. at 608, 619. 
114 Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge and 
Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985). 
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capture in the creation of a court with limited jurisdiction.115  Donald 
Dunner, then-President of the American Patent Law Association, even 
lauded the proposed merger of the Court of Claims and the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals as “absolutely ingenious” for its ability to 
eliminate concerns about “the tunnel vision problem” of a completely 
specialized court.116  Congress’ creation of a court with such wide 
jurisdiction would thus seem to belie the idea that industry was involved in 
this process in a purely self-interested way of the type postulated by public 
choice theory.117   
Further, the personalities of the various executive branch individuals 
involved in the lead-up to the FCIA loom large in the literature on the 
subject.  All accounts of Attorney General Bell’s tenure at the Department 
of Justice and his creation of the OIAJ suggest that he placed great 
emphasis on the “non-political nature of the Department, thus making it 
more likely that Congress would see those proposals as high-minded efforts 
to improve the system and not as part of a partisan agenda.”118  Daniel 
Meador himself has been described as the “father of the court.”119  
Discussions of OIAJ’s role more broadly take pains to emphasis its non-
partisan character.  As Meador recounts:  
Once OIAJ developed a bill and obtained its introduction in 
Congress, the assistant attorney general and the lawyers 
working under him actively engaged in discussions with both 
the Democratic and Republican staffs of the House and 
                                                
115 H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 31; see also generally Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for 
Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951) 
(warning of the dangers of such a specialized court). 
116 Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, 96th Cong., 93 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 House Hearing]; see also id. at 
629 (statement of Harry F. Manbeck on behalf of Comm. for Econ. Dev.) (supporting a 
proposal to give the Federal Circuit “added jurisdiction over matters besides patent 
appeals” because this would “keep the court from being over-specialized”). 
117 Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN L. REV. 329, 
334-35 (1991) (“In forming the CAFC, Congress sought to avoid overspecialization and 
capture by creating ‘a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues.’” (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 97-312, at 31)). 
118 Meador, supra note 85, at 538.  
119 Mayer, supra note 98, at 559 (remarks of then-Chief Judge Mayer); see also id. at 557 
(then-Chief Judge Mayer noting that his association with the Federal Circuit “goes back to 
the mid-1970s, when what was to become the court was but a gleam in the eye of Professor 
Dan Meador”); Seamon, supra note 96, at 559 (describing Meador as “[t]he father of the 
FCIA”).  
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Senate Judiciary Committees, in an effort to secure 
bipartisan passage. They were in effect lobbying for those 
bills, thus engaging in political activity. However, there were 
never any “deals” offered, no quid pro quo discussed. OIAJ 
never suggested trading something, such as favorable 
consideration of a proposed judicial nominee, for support of 
a bill. The effort was entirely to explain the bill and make a 
case for its passage.120 
These accounts suggest that the interaction between Congress and 
neutral members of the executive branch was a key driving factor in moving 
these bills forward, rather than interaction between Congress and the 
various regulated industries.121  
There is additional evidence that Congress carefully considered and 
debated each aspect of the judicial reform issue, in contrast to the enactment 
of several copyright-related bills as briefly recounted in the previous Part.  
Senator Dennis DeConcini, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, recalls the 
Subcommittee’s “lengthy debate over the proper methods to reduce the 
enormous burden placed on the judicial system.”122  Senator DeConcini 
notes the Subcommittee’s conclusion that patent cases “realistically had 
little chance of Supreme Court review” as compared to other areas of 
substantive law that differed among the circuits, perhaps due to patent law’s 
technical nature, exacerbating the need to standardize such decisions and 
making patent law a central topic of the Subcommittee’s discussions.123  
                                                
120 Meador, supra note 85, at 538–39. 
121 Seamon, supra note 96, at 596 (“Many good, timely ideas die in the halls of Congress. 
The FCIA avoided that fate because it had leadership in the executive branch. The 
leadership came from Dean Meador and the rest of the OIAJ, which secured the backing of 
the DOJ and the president. With that support in place, the FCIA gained congressional 
leadership in both houses.”). 
122 Dennis DeConcini, The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982: A Legislative 
Overview, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 529, 529 (1992). 
123 Id.; see also id. at 532 (quoting Dean Erwin Griswold as noting that some areas of law 
are disproportionately burdened by a lack of uniformity, and that this condition “is 
especially true in areas where there are a large number of recurring questions, no one of 
which is of great importance by itself, and most of which are not worthy of review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. There are a number of fields in which such questions 
are concentrated. One of these is . . . that of patents and trademarks.”); Seamon, supra note 
96, at 556 (“[M]any who thought that inconsistency was a problem also thought that it was 
a particularly acute problem in patent and tax cases.”). 
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And in conducting hearings in 1979 evaluating Meador’s proposal, the 
Subcommittee heard testimony “from all areas of the legal profession.”124 
Ultimately, it seems that the “regulated parties”—industry and the 
patent bar, broadly—did not play a dispositive role in the enactment of the 
FCIA.  Despite theoretical predictions that this is the type of issue they 
ought to be concerned about, they did not organize in any significant way or 
engage with Congress or the OIAJ on this issue in a particularly involved 
way.  Yet the FCIA nevertheless passed, with overwhelming executive and 
legislative support. 
Admittedly, a statute creating a specialized court is a bit of an odd 
situation to analyze from a public choice theory perspective.  Specifically, 
the Federal Circuit did not exist before the statute created it.  Insofar as 
statutes usually benefit or harm an existing interest group, the FCIA 
arguably created an interest group—the Federal Circuit—where none 
previously existed.  And even though the Federal Circuit did come to be 
made up of judges from the former Court of Claims and Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals125 (judges who certainly existed and had an interest in 
the enactment of the FCIA), at least some of these judges largely avoided 
advocating for the FCIA throughout the process to avoid any appearance of 
impropriety.126    
Additionally, it is surely somewhat of an odd fit to discuss the 
Federal Circuit as an interest group.  As a federal court, it does not possess 
many of the characteristics we might otherwise ascribe to political actors.  
For instance, it certainly does not overtly spend money lobbying for its own 
perpetuation or for Congress to give it greater authority.  Yet in many ways 
the Federal Circuit does lobby for its own existence, through the judges’ 
judicial and extra-judicial activities127 and through its posture regarding the 
regulated industry (in ways that should at least make the industry oppose 
                                                
124 DeConcini, supra note 122, at 530. 
125 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
126 See Meador, supra note 112, at 609 (“Chief Judge Markey again expressed the view he 
had stated many times previously that it would be unwise for his court to take any position 
one way or the other on the pending proposal.” (citing the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1979) 
(statement of Hon. Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals))).   
127 See, e.g., Todd Ruger, Appellate Judge Warns of Congressional Overreach on Patent 
Reform, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/appellate-judge-warns-of-congressional-
overreach-on-patent-reform.html; Tony Dutra, Current and Former Federal Circuit Chief 
Judges Defend Patent System Benefit to U.S. Public, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bna.com/current-former-federal-n17179871184/. 
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efforts to eliminate the court).128  And there is a growing body of 
scholarship addressing the interests and incentives of government 
institutions, like the PTO, as interest groups in a very real sense.129 
B. Present But Disorganized: The Bayh-Dole Act 
Around the same time that Congress and the executive branch were 
embroiled in debates about appropriate reforms to the federal judiciary, 
there was also an ongoing debate about the ability of institutions receiving 
federal funds for research to patent any discoveries resulting from that 
research.  The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 generally permitted “non-profit 
organization[s]” (including universities) and “small business firm[s]” to 
“retain title to any subject invention,” permitting those organizations to file 
for patents on their subject inventions, except in a few specialized 
circumstances regarding gove rnment-owned facilities, national security, or 
“exceptional circumstances.”130  Subsequently, the number of universities 
with dedicated technology transfer offices (TTOs) skyrocketed,131 and today 
the Association of University Technology Managers, which brings together 
university TTOs for various data-gathering, organizational, and political 
reasons,132 is a powerful force for change in this area.  Unlike in the case of 
the creation of the Federal Circuit, the regulated interest group here—
university TTOs, essentially—did exist in some form prior to the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act.  Yet evidence suggests that TTOs in general had little 
involvement in the passage of the statute, although public choice theory 
would predict otherwise.  Further, the lobbying activities of industry (which 
may in some sense be viewed as the real party in interest here) do not 
clearly provide an alternate explanation for the Act’s passage.   
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, the situation facing university 
technology managers who wanted to patent and commercialize the results 
                                                
128 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571–72 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002) (“Congress contemplated 
that the Federal Circuit would ‘strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as 
to foster technological growth and industrial innovation.’ Issues such as the one before us 
in this case are properly reserved for this court to answer with ‘its special expertise.’”).   
129 See generally, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding 
Affect Decisionmaking? An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013). 
130 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
131 But see infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text for arguments that the marginal 
effect of Bayh-Dole on university technology transfer programs beyond the already-
occurring expansion thereof is small. 
132AUTM Board of Directors: Mission and Goals, ASSOC. OF UNIV. TECHNOLOGY 
MANAGERS (July 22, 2009), http://www.autm.net/Mission_and_Goals/9885.htm. 
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of their faculty members’ innovation could be described in one word: chaos.  
In general, the federal government was presumed to have the right to take 
title to patents stemming from federally funded research at universities.  
And the government had long recognized that the question of which 
organization should take title to patents resulting from federally-funded 
research (the government as grantor or the university as grantee) was 
complex.133  By 1979, there were “at least 24 different patent policies in 
effect in the Federal agencies.”134  Ultimately, the fate of grantees hoping to 
take title to patents resulting from research was highly dependent on the 
identity of the agency from which the grant came.135  Further, these policies 
were “frequently contradictory from agency to agency (and even sometimes 
within the same agency) and [] prove[d] to be formidable barriers to 
organizations interested in participation in Government work.”136   
The complexity of the situation had not gone unnoticed, however.  
As early as 1963, President Kennedy had issued an executive order 
intending to bring some uniformity to the situation, recognizing the “need 
for greater consistency in agency practices in order to further the 
governmental and public interest in promoting the utilization of federally 
financed inventions and to avoid difficulties caused by different approaches 
by the agencies when dealing with the same class of organizations in 
comparable patent situations.”137  Essentially, though, President Kennedy’s 
order imposed only a superstructural uniformity in which each of the federal 
grantor agencies placed default ownership of such patents with the federal 
government, allowing grantees to take title only where “the contractor or 
grantee successfully completes lengthy waiver procedures justifying why 
patent rights should be left to the inventor.”138  These waiver procedures 
(which continued to differ among agencies) were “difficult,” and only “in 
                                                
133 See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimensions: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2012). 
134 S. Rep. No. 96-480, at 2 (1979). 
135 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2175 n.38 
(2009) (“DHEW, for example, had a policy of negotiating IPAs with universities, while the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) allowed universities to retain title if the universities 
followed ‘approved’ patent policies.”). 
136 S. Rep. No. 96-480, at 2 (1979). 
137 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 28 Fed. Reg. 
10,943, 10,943 (Oct. 12, 1963). 
138 S. Rep. No. 96-480, at 2 (observing also that “[i]n general, the present patent policies 
require contractors and grantees to allow the funding agency to own any patentable 
discoveries made under research and development supported by the Federal Government”). 
27
Sachs: The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 344 (2014)  2013-2014  
371 
rare cases” did petitions survive the process.139  It is unsurprising that the 
system continued to engender discontent.  
In December 1965, the Federal Council for Science and Technology 
established the Committee on Government Patent Policy to examine the 
impact of President Kennedy’s policy statement and to gather additional 
information about the situation.140  The Committee then commissioned 
Harbridge House to conduct a review of federal patent policy.141  The 
review discovered that one variable affecting the commercial utilization of 
innovations stemming from federally-funded research was “whether or not 
the contractor or another assignee had exclusive patent rights.”142  
Specifically, the rate of commercialization of patents was much higher 
when the contractor had taken title to their invention (23.8%) as compared 
to when the federal government had retained title (13.3%).143  And so in 
August 1971, President Nixon issued a new policy statement, in which he 
                                                
139 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE LAW 
AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999); see also Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 
95–96 (1999) (“Although some federal agencies allowed university patenting of federally 
sponsored research, the process of obtaining the right to patent was generally cumbersome 
and complex, and thus the number of cases in which patenting occurred was small.”). 
140 Memorandum about Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887, 16,887 (Aug. 23, 
1971). 
141 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1679 
(1996).  
142 F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 181–82 (2009).  Professor Scherer also notes one 
particularly “extreme” application of the Committee’s general research, in the 
pharmaceutical context: 
[U]p to 1962, drug companies routinely screened new organic molecules synthesized under 
government grants by academic researchers. However, when the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) imposed new reporting requirements that threatened the 
exclusivity of drug companies’ rights to commercialize molecules found to be 
therapeutically interesting, such testing ceased abruptly. The moratorium ended in 1968 
when HEW changed its policies to allow drug companies exclusive rights on grant-
originated molecules they tested. 
Id. at 181–82.  For a more extensive discussion of this particular example, see Eisenberg, 
supra note 141, at 1682–84.  In this, like in most other areas of patent law, the 
pharmaceutical industry seems to be the outlier in terms of the severity of their connection 
to the phenomenon.  Yet the industry’s importance to society suggests that this event may 
have served as a precipitating factor of the Act. 
143 Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 1680.  But see id. (“[I]t should be noted that eighty-three 
percent of the contractor inventions included in the Harbridge House data had been funded 
by DoD under contracts and policies that would have permitted the contractors to retain 
title if they had so elected.”). 
28
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/3
THE NEW MODEL OF INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATION IN PATENT LAW 
 
372 
emphasized that although a “Government-wide policy best serves the public 
interest,” such a policy must be “flexible” about the ownership of patent 
rights.144  President Nixon recommended a revised policy that would give 
agency heads “additional authority to permit contractors to obtain greater 
rights to inventions where necessary to achieve utilization.”145  
Congress soon took action, with the White House proposing a draft 
bill in August 1976 and the House drafting its own version soon 
thereafter.146  Subsequent hearings before the House Committee on Science 
and Technology and Monopolies Subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee included testimony from a wide range of individuals and 
organizations, including representatives of the Committee on Government 
Patent Policy, representatives of several federal agencies that issue research 
grants, the Society of University Patent Administrators (SUPA) (the 
predecessor to AUTM), anti-patent scholars, and the consumer activist 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.147 
In the end, the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in December 1980, 
reversing the presumption that the federal agency grantor would retain title 
to the inventions resulting from such federal grants and permitting 
universities and small businesses to take title in such cases, subject to a few 
exceptions.148  Since the pre-Bayh-Dole patchwork of federal regulations 
had engendered confusion and discontent among both federal grantees and 
the agencies themselves, one of Congress’ purposes in enacting the Act was 
to “minimize the costs of administering policies in this area,”149 and by 
effectively standardizing the reversal of its presumption, Congress was able 
to do so.  Yet Congress had also explicitly stated a series of additional 
purposes in the statute.  Specifically: 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the 
patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising 
from federally supported research or development; to 
                                                
144 Memorandum about Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 at 16,887. 
145 Id at 16,888.  
146 Scherer, supra note 142, at 182.  The Senate had already made one halting attempt to 
address this issue, in 1965 introducing a bill that included compromise policies.  The bill’s 
progress, however, was postponed pending the completion of the Committee’s studies.  Id.  
147 See Government Patent Policy: The Ownership of Inventions Resulting from Federally 
Funded Research and Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l 
Scientific Planning and Analysis of the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 94th Cong. 12 (1976); 
Government Patent Policies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly and 
Anticompetitive Activities of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong. (Dec. 1977). 
148 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).  
149 35 U.S.C. § 200.  
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encourage maximum participation of small business firms in 
federally supported research and development efforts; to 
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small 
business firms are used in a manner to promote free 
competition and enterprise; to promote the 
commercialization and public availability of inventions made 
in the United States by United States industry and labor; 
[and] to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights 
in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the 
Government and protect the public against nonuse or 
unreasonable use of inventions[.]150 
The compromises struck in the Act reflect the complexity of these 
policy goals.  For instance, the final goal—ensuring the retention of 
sufficient rights for the Government—underlies the statute’s grant of 
march-in rights.  Yet the goals of encouraging commercialization and 
utilization of inventions support the statute’s limiting of these rights to cases 
in which the patent holder “has not taken, or is not expected to take within a 
reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the 
subject invention in such field of use” or where “action is necessary to 
alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the 
contractor, assignee, or their licensees.”151   
Commentary is mixed as to whether the Act succeeded in 
accomplishing its mission.  There is of course general agreement that the 
absolute number of TTOs has skyrocketed in the decades since 1980,152 as 
has the number of patents granted each year to universities,153 the amount of 
                                                
150 Id. 
151 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)–(b).  
152 See David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, & Arvids A. Ziedonis, 
The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects 
of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 104 (2001) (“[T]he number of universities 
with technology licensing and transfer offices increased from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990.”); 
see also Rebecca Goulding et al., Alternative Intellectual Property for Genomics and the 
Activity of Technology Transfer Offices: Emerging Directions in Research, 16 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 194, 201 (2010). 
153 See Rai, supra note 139, at 109 (“[F]rom 1980 to 1992, the number of patents granted 
per year to universities increased from fewer than 250 to almost 2,700.”); see also Patent 
Issues in Federally Funded Research: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 103rd Cong. 11 (1994) (statement of Birch Bayh) 
(summarizing similar data). 
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royalties paid to TTOs in licensing fees,154 and the number of companies 
spun off of universities.155  The Bayh-Dole Act is certainly 
“contemporaneous with a sharp increase in U.S. university patenting and 
licensing activity.”156  But David Mowery and others have questioned 
precisely how much of this growth is attributable to the Act itself, as other 
factors (like the growth of the biotechnology industry and the increasing 
willingness of the Supreme Court to permit patents on basic inventions in 
that field157) might have contributed to the growth in such activity in any 
case.158  Mowery argues that an “array of developments in academic 
research, industry and policy thus combined to increase U.S. universities’ 
activities in technology licensing, and Bayh-Dole, while important, was not 
determinative,” particularly for universities like Stanford that had already 
engaged in patenting and licensing activity.159  Further, it is far from clear 
that these metrics are the correct ones to determine whether Congress’s 
objectives regarding commercialization have been met.  Although the 
numbers of patents granted and royalties paid in licensing fees have 
                                                
154 See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization 
of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government 
Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 177 (2007) (“[U]niversity profits have gone 
from a baseline approaching nil in 1980 to well in excess of $1.5B by 2007.”); Mowery et 
al., supra note 152, at 104. 
155 See Bouchard, supra 154, at 124 (“[I]n FY 2002 US universities brought in 
approximately $1B in licensing royalties, filed 6,500 patent applications, executed 3,700 
licenses and created over 400 startups.”); ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
MANAGERS, FY 2002 LICENSING SURVEY (2003). 
156 Mowery et al., supra note 152, at 103; see also Goulding, et al., supra note 152, at 201. 
157 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980); see also Peter Lee, 
Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2225 at 2232 n.44 
(“[P]assage of the Bayh-Dole Act was not the only catalytic event that spurred greater 
university patenting. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court expansively construed patentable 
subject matter so as to include many products of the nascent biotechnology industry. . . . In 
addition, advances in molecular biology revealed a relatively clear path from ‘basic’ 
discoveries to commercial products, thus enhancing opportunities for university 
patenting.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS. 
& CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1014 (2006). 
158 See Mowery et al., supra note 152, at 116; see also Kesan, supra note 135, at 2177 
(“[T]hese circumstances led to a ‘chicken or the egg’ debate. On one hand, the Bayh-Dole 
Act might have caused the increase in university patenting; on the other, the demand for the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act could have resulted from increased patenting activity by 
universities.”). 
159 Mowery et al., supra note 152, at 116; see id. at 117. But see Goulding, et al., supra note 
152, at 201 (“[P]atenting by research institutions in the United States was possible and 
practiced even prior to 1980. The Bayh-Dole Act did not, in fact, change this reality. It did, 
however, serve the important functions of making the process uniform and easier to 
implement across governmental funding agencies.”). 
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increased, most TTOs are either losing money or are barely breaking even 
on their expenses.160   
Other commenters have focused more on the conceptual shifts 
occasioned by Bayh-Dole and the normative desirability of the Act’s 
effects.  For instance, Professor Arti Rai emphasizes the Act’s effects on the 
traditional Mertonian norms of scientific research.161  These norms 
“promote a public domain of freely available scientific information, 
independent choice in the selection of research topics, and (perhaps above 
all) respect for uninhibited scientific invention.”162  Yet the “dramatic 
increases in patenting activity,” “delays in publication,” and “restrictions on 
the sharing of research materials and tools caused by concerns about 
intellectual property rights” after Bayh-Dole have “undermined” the norms 
against secrecy.163  In practice, the Act also affects the “commercial 
orientation”164 of universities, with many commentators arguing that it has 
caused universities to emphasize applied research at the expense of basic 
research, which has traditionally been seen as the heart of a university’s 
public purpose.165  Others have expressed concern about the effect of this 
                                                
160 See Kesan, supra note 135, at 2181–84, 2188–89; Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price 
of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1431 (2007) 
(“Universities typically do not make money from their technology-transfer offices once 
expenses are paid and disbursements are made.”).  But see Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, 
Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1729, 1734–35 (1996) (“Few institutions are currently generating big dollars from royalties 
or licenses. . . . But these are relatively unrestricted discretionary funds—perhaps the most 
difficult moneys to find, yet, the most important in allowing a wise and well-prepared Dean 
to shape the future of an institution.”). 
161 Rai, supra note 139, at 88.  
162 Id. at 89–90. 
163 Id. at 115; see Lee, supra note 157, at 2233 (“[W]hat are the normative implications of 
the push of patents? These developments raise the question of whether and to what extent 
universities should promote particular policy objectives . . . in their technology transfer 
practices. This question is ultimately a component of a broader inquiry into the proper role 
of universities in society.”).  Further, Bayh-Dole was premised on Edward Kitch’s 
“development-oriented” idea that traditional norms of science (those in which patenting is 
not typical) impeded goals of developing products.  However, this idea has often been 
highly criticized. See Rai, supra note 139, at 115–21. 
164 Bouchard, supra note 154, at 121. 
165 See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 135, at 2192; Massaro, supra note 160, at 1732 (“It is 
almost impossible to overestimate the magnitude of change in universities. As an academic 
physician interested in the business of medicine, I have seen a revolution in our thinking 
about the nature of our core activity—the generation of new knowledge. Innovation and 
technology transfer are now more closely linked. This has brought an associated interest in 
patents, licenses and royalties.”); Bayhing for Blood or Doling Out Cash?, THE ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/5327661 (“[The Bayh-Dole Act] makes 
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change in orientation on the equities of the Act, contending that “the public 
assumes a majority share of the risks and economic inefficiencies of the 
current commercialization regime, and that patentee firms and universities 
retain the lion’s share of the fiscal rewards and economic efficiencies of 
commercialization.”166 
Under the traditional public choice theory account, the purpose and 
structure of the Act suggest that its enactment might have been motivated 
by the lobbying activities of universities and of already-existing TTOs who 
faced difficulty navigating the existing nonuniform federal policies 
regarding patenting.  The primary benefits of such a policy would be 
concentrated among a relatively small, identifiable group of individuals: 
universities and their TTOs, although other related groups, such as small 
companies relying on government funding, could benefit as well.  Further, 
the costs to society are not only diffuse, but they can be framed in a public-
regarding way,167 by emphasizing the societal benefits of incentivizing 
innovation.  The regulated parties here, universities and TTOs, certainly 
existed during the statute’s conception and passage.  Further, 
representatives thereof testified at some of the congressional hearings held 
during the drafting of the Act.  But there is no evidence that the burgeoning 
technology transfer industry drove the enactment of the statute in a way that 
is comparable to the industry involvement seen in the copyright space. The 
testimony at the various congressional hearings of members of Stanford’s 
then-three-person technology transfer office168 or of SUPA was surely 
helpful to the statute’s drafters, but this is not a situation in which 
                                                                                                                       
American academic institutions behave more like businesses than neutral arbiters of 
truth.”). 
166 Bouchard, supra note 154, at 190; see also id. at 163; see generally Goulding, et al., 
supra note 152. 
167 This is less true in the copyright space.  For instance, the public-regarding argument 
about the statute at issue in Golan v. Holder, restoring copyright protection in works that 
had already been elevated into the public domain, is not easy to make.  See, e.g., Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The statute before us, 
however, does not encourage anyone to produce a single new work. By definition, it 
bestows monetary rewards only on owners of old works—works that have already been 
created and already are in the American public domain. At the same time, the statute 
inhibits the dissemination of those works . . . .”). 
168 See Rai, supra note 139, at 95 n.102; see also The University and Small Business Patent 
Procedures Act: Hearings on S.414 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 
178, at 210 (1979) (statement of Niels Reimers, Manager of Technology Licensing, 
Stanford University). 
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universities proposed and drafted the legislation or in which Congress heard 
testimony only from the universities.169 
However, there is a real sense in which universities and TTOs are 
not the relevant parties for public choice theory purposes.  Of course 
universities and TTOs valued their ability to engage in patenting and 
licensing activity.  But public choice theory might also suppose that 
corporations, those that deal with universities in their licensing activities, 
would be involved in the enactment of the statute.170  Industry 
representatives were certainly included in the various congressional 
hearings preceding the Act’s passage.  Further, industrial involvement 
would explain certain substantive provisions of the statute.  For instance, 
the Act’s protections for government are extremely weak.171  The march-in 
rights discussed above have never been exercised in the more than thirty 
years since 1980, and proposed “recoupment”172 and “reasonable price”173 
provisions were ultimately not included in the text of the Act.  The statute 
                                                
169 See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the statute before 
the Court and observing that “Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony only 
from the representatives of existing copyright holders”).  Certainly, the role of the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) in the passage of the statute must be 
mentioned.  WARF asserts that the language of the Bayh-Dole Act, in the words of Carl 
Gulbrandsen, tracks “verbatim” the language of the Institutional Patent Agreements 
negotiated between WARF and the Department of Health, Education, & Welfare.  See Carl 
E. Gulbrandsen, Bayh-Dole: Wisconsin Roots and Inspired Public Policy, 2007 WIS. L. 
REV. 1149, 1157; WARF & Bayh-Dole, WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION (last 
visited May 26 2014), http://www.warf.org/home/about-us/background/history/warf-bayh-
dole/warf-and-bayh-dole.cmsx (“Bayh-Dole is often seen as a codification of the terms and 
provisions contained in the first IPA between WARF and DHEW.”).  Although WARF 
asserts its “leadership role in helping to draft and promote the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act,” Gulbrandsen, supra, at 1163, I could not find publicly available evidence to support 
this conclusion.  
170 See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, UNDERSTANDING UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED517264.pdf (“By 
enabling corporations to negotiate exclusive licenses of promising technologies, the Act 
encouraged them to invest in the additional research, development, and manufacturing 
capabilities needed to bring new products to market.”). 
171 See Rai, supra note 139, at 148 (“The Act provides that ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
must exist before an agency can determine that restriction or elimination of a university’s 
right to seek patents on an invention serves the Act’s goals of development and 
commercialization. Moreover, the determination of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is subject 
to an administrative appeals procedure.”). 
172 See Bouchard, supra note 154, at 174 (“Recoupment would have seen the federal 
government receive 15% of gross income over $70,000 and an additional 5% on income in 
excess of $1M—up to the amount [of] government contributions under the funding 
agreement(s).”). 
173 Id. at 175. 
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even provides that small businesses, not just nonprofit organizations, may 
also take title to their inventions qualifying under the Act.174  Yet the 
resulting statute is still clearly the product of compromise rather than 
industry railroading.  Industry proposed an amendment that would have 
extended the Act’s provisions to cover large businesses,175 but the 
amendment was defeated in the Senate.176  Only years later did President 
Reagan, in an executive order, instruct agencies to treat large firms similarly 
under the Act.177  
The Bayh-Dole Act thus appears to be a case in which, although the 
university-industrial complex was certainly present and had views about the 
proposed statute, it did not drive the Act’s creation or passage.  Similar to 
the case of the FCIA, executive reports and memoranda convinced 
Congress of the need for such reform, and although input from the regulated 
parties was helpful, it was far from dispositive in propelling the statute 
through Congress.  
C. Present and Organized, But Opposing: The Hatch-Waxman 
Act 
Congress passed the third and final statute in this series of patent-
related interventions, the Hatch-Waxman Act (or, as it is officially known, 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act) in 1984, soon 
after the Bayh-Dole Act and the FCIA.  As its formal name would suggest, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act contained two main substantive provisions: first, it 
statutorily created a pathway for approval of generic drugs through the 
filing of Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs),178 and second, it 
provided for extension of the patent term for new drugs, subject to 
                                                
174 35 U.S.C. §202(a), (c)(4) (2012). See Rai, supra note 139, at 96 n.109; Government 
Patent Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech. of the 
House of Representatives Comm. on Science and Tech., 96th Cong. 45–190 (1979) 
(testimony of witnesses from large and small businesses).  
175 See Rai, supra note 139, at 96 n.109; Government Patent Policy: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Science, Research and Tech. of the House of Representatives Comm. on 
Science and Tech., 96th Cong. 53–54 (1979) (statement of John Maurer, Patent Counsel at 
Monsanto, arguing that “patent exclusivity is equally important for research done in 
universities, small businesses and large businesses. In fact, large businesses are often the 
only places which have the skill for some types of research and the resources to support 
long-term innovation. It simply would be self-defeating to limit a sound patent policy to 
only universities and small businesses.”). 
176 See Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 1694. 
177 Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Government 
Patent Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983). 
178 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
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limitations on the total period of post-approval protection.179  Although the 
Act has certainly inspired litigation between the various industry groups,180 
each of these major provisions has also been critical to continued 
profitability, with the then-burgeoning generic drug industry exploding after 
the Act’s passage181 and branded pharmaceutical firms relying heavily on 
the patent extension provisions to ensure that they are able to extract 
monopoly rents sufficient to recoup their investments182 into a given drug. 
Unlike in either the FCIA or Bayh-Dole cases, the relevant interest groups 
in this case—the generic drug industry and the branded pharmaceutical 
industry—were both deeply involved in the Act’s passage.  The Hatch-
Waxman Act thus looks very much like a classic example of public choice 
theory.  Yet as the stakeholder groups were on opposite sides of the issue, 
the public choice account of the statute is more complex than is typically 
predicted, and the Act’s provisions reflect compromise between the groups. 
The road to Hatch-Waxman began decades before its enactment, 
when Senator Estes Kefauver in 1959 convened a series of hearings on 
pharmaceutical prices before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly.  The Subcommittee argued that industry laboratories contributed 
little social value, and that where the original research had come from 
outside industry or industry had merely created “me-too” drugs, the high 
prices charged for these drugs could not be justified.183  Kefauver 
                                                
179 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2012). 
180 Contention particularly surrounds “Paragraph IV” certifications in which the generic 
drug applicant certifies that the patent on which their drug is based “is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is 
submitted.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).  The originating manufacturer may then sue the 
generic applicant for patent infringement.  See Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, 
Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (summarizing the Paragraph IV system). 
181 See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 418 (2011) 
(“Today, seven out of ten prescriptions in the United States are for generic drugs. As of 
2007, of the 12,751 listed drugs in the Orange Book, 10,072 of the listed drugs have 
generic counterparts. In 2007, brand pharmaceutical sales totaled $228 billion, while 
generic pharmaceutical sales totaled $58.5 billion.”). 
182 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003) (estimating the full cost of 
developing a new drug at $802 million).  But see Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, 
Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 46 
(2011) (estimating the cost of R&D at $43.4 million per new drug). 
183 See William S. Comanor, The Drug Industry and Medical Research: The Economics of 
the Kefauver Committee Investigations, 39 J. BUS. 12, 12 (1966).  Pharmaceutical 
companies opposed this contention, arguing that their laboratories had created, in 
Comanor’s words, “most of the new drugs that [were] extensively utilized” in medical 
practice.  Id. at 13.  
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subsequently proposed a bill requiring mandatory cross-licensing of drug 
patents, in an attempt to lower drug prices.184  Ultimately, though, 
simultaneous societal developments—specifically, the thalidomide 
tragedy—subverted Kefauver’s bill into one that, for the first time, would 
require drug companies to prove “substantial evidence”185 of efficacy and 
safety prior to receiving FDA approval for their products.  The subsequently 
adopted Drug Amendments of 1962186 to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, also known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendment, included only one 
element from Kefauver’s initial cross-licensing proposal: the requirement 
that drug labels disclose the generic name for the drug.187  
Yet the federal government’s subsequent establishment of Medicare 
and Medicaid in 1965 soon brought the drug pricing issue to the fore once 
again, as the federal government in its new funding role more directly faced 
the high costs of prescription drugs than it had previously.  The FDA used 
its flexibility under the 1962 amendments to establish an ANDA pathway 
for the marketing of generic versions of pre-1962 prescription drugs that 
had been determined to be effective under the Drug Efficacy Study 
Implementation (DESI) program, which was designed to examine all pre-
1962 drugs and classify them by effectiveness.  Under this pathway, generic 
applicants only needed to show bioavailability and bioequivalence to obtain 
FDA approval.188  For drugs approved after 1962, however, the FDA in 
1980 could only establish a “paper NDA” pathway to generic approval. 
Through this “paper NDA” pathway, generic versions of drugs that were 
generally recognized as safe and effective “based on publicly available 
data” (typically, scientific literature) could pursue an abbreviated path to 
approval.189  But these conditions were met only rarely, and thus this 
avenue was not commonly pursued.190  The FDA then drafted a regulation 
to establish an ANDA process for drugs approved after 1962,191 and generic 
                                                
184 See Social Reassessment, Regulation, and Growth: 1960–80, AMERICAN CHEMICAL 
SOCIETY (2005), https://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/83/8325/8325social.html. 
185 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
186 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). 
187 See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND 
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 754 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2007). 
188 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2013). 
189 See Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent 
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984. 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 276 (1985); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & 
Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 585, 589 (2003).  
190 See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 189, at 590. 
191 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 189, at 276. 
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drug companies filed a lawsuit seeking to compel the FDA to establish the 
proposed ANDA process.192  Ultimately, the case became moot with the 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act.193   
In general, the 1962 amendments required generic pharmaceutical 
companies seeking to introduce generic versions of drugs approved after 
1962 to complete full NDAs and surmount two formidable obstacles before 
they could market their products: First, generic manufacturers had to wait 
for the drug patent to expire before even beginning to develop their own 
generic version.  The Federal Circuit in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co.194 had explicitly held that “taking, during the life of a 
patent, the statutory and regulatory steps necessary to market, after the 
patent expired, a drug equivalent to a patented brand name drug” 
constituted “a violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific 
inquiry.’”195  And second, generic drug companies had to conduct the full 
panoply of FDA-mandated clinical trials on their generic version of the 
originator molecule.  Both of these obstacles contributed substantially to the 
significant lags then observed between the expiration of a patent on a given 
drug and the approval of a generic version of that drug.  Thus, although 
generic drugs certainly existed in the 1970s, their access to the market for 
post-1962 drugs was significantly restricted.  
At the same time, the corrosive impact of the 1962 amendments on 
the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals had become evident.196  With the 
addition of the effectiveness requirement, each additional day post-patent 
grant that companies spent conducting studies to prove efficacy was an 
additional day taken from the manufacturer’s exclusivity.  Moreover, 
studies showed that this effect was not trivial.  One study concluded that, 
between 1966 and 1979, the effective post-approval life of a patent had 
declined from 13.6 years to 9.5 years.197  Admittedly, the requirement that 
generic manufacturers wait for patent expiration before beginning 
development of their own versions “resulted in a de facto extension of the 
                                                
192 See Kelly, supra note 181, at 420 n.36 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. 
Heckler, 83 Civ. 4817 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y)). 
193 See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 189, at 420. 
194 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
195 Id. at 860, 863. 
196 See, e.g., Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 189, at 588. 
197 Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 526, 527 
(1984); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857 (Pt. I), at 17 (1984); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 
316 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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patent term,” as such development took a “substantial amount of time,”198 
but the problem was still perceived as acute. 
In the 97th Congress, bills were introduced in both the House and 
the Senate that would have restored patent terms, but that would have 
avoided addressing the generic drug issue entirely.  Although the Senate 
bill, S. 255, passed that chamber in July of 1981,199 the House bill died in 
Committee after hearings on the subject were conducted.200  In the next 
term, the House marked up the bill and drafted a clean version, which was 
successfully reported out of committee.  In September 1982, H.R. 6444 was 
then brought up on the suspension calendar, which requires a majority of 
two-thirds of that chamber to pass a given bill.  H.R. 6444 received a simple 
majority of the vote, but it failed to achieve the required two-thirds margin 
of victory.201  It is noteworthy that during this session of Congress, the 
hearings conducted by those in support of the patent term restoration bill 
were counterbalanced by hearings sponsored by Representative Henry 
Waxman and then-Representative Al Gore, “opponents of patent term 
legislation.”202 
In the 98th Congress, however, Henry Waxman introduced H.R. 
3605, a bill that would balance patent term restoration for branded 
pharmaceuticals with ANDAs for drugs receiving FDA approval after 1962.  
After “extensive negotiation[]”203 between representatives of the generic 
and originator pharmaceutical firms, the Hatch-Waxman Act passed 
unanimously in the House and by voice vote in the Senate204 before being 
signed into law.205  
Hatch-Waxman was thus “the product of compromise” between 
branded pharmaceutical firms and generic manufacturers.206  Congress’ 
                                                
198 Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at 1357; see also Eli Lilly & Co v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 
U.S. 661, 670 (1990) (referring to the Bolar case and noting that “the combined effect of 
the patent law and the premarket regulatory approval requirement was to create an effective 
extension of the patent term”). 
199 Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, S. 255, 97th Cong (1981). 
200 Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, H.R. 1937 97th Cong. (1981). 
201 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857 (Pt. II), at 3; see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 187, 188 (1999). 
202 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857 (Pt. II), at 3. 
203 Id. at 4. 
204 Scherer, supra note 142, at 198. 
205 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585, 1598–99 (1984). 
206 Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (“The Act emerged from Congress’ efforts to balance two conflicting policy 
objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary 
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dueling objectives are stated clearly not only in the title of the Act itself, but 
also in the “relatively sparse”207 legislative history on the subject:  
The purpose of Title I of the bill is to make available more 
low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug 
approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after 
1962. . . .  The purpose of Title II of the Bill is to create a 
new incentive for increased expenditures for research and 
development of certain products which are subject to 
premarket government approval. The incentive is the 
restoration of some of the time lost on patent life while the 
product is awaiting pre-market approval.208  
The Act provides market exclusivity and patent term restoration 
incentives to branded pharmaceutical firms, while simultaneously 
establishing a safe harbor for pre-patent expiration generic development209 
and permitting generic drug companies to employ the data generated by the 
originator applicants.  In a broad sense, this compromise seems to have 
effectuated increased generic production and increased research in the 
branded pharmaceutical space.210   
                                                                                                                       
to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to 
bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”); see also, e.g., Warner-Lambert 
Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act was 
accordingly a compromise between two competing sets of interests: those of innovative 
drug manufacturers, who had seen their effective patent terms shortened by the testing and 
regulatory processes; and those of generic drug manufacturers, whose entry into the market 
upon expiration of the innovator’s patents had been delayed by similar regulatory 
requirements.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 356 (2007) (referring to the Act as a “legislative 
compromise[]”); Kelly, supra note 181, at 417 (“The Act was a compromise designed to 
balance the competing interests of research-based pharmaceutical companies . . . and 
generic drug manufacturers . . . .”). 
207 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 189, at 271; see also Mossinghoff, supra note 201, at 187 
(“There is a paucity of legislative history on the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).  
208 H. Rep. No. 98-857 (Pt. I), at 14–15. 
209 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer 
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention 
. . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.”).  The Act’s legislative history on this provision references the Bolar 
case by name, stating that it explicitly intended to overturn the ruling in the case.  H. Rep. 
No. 98-857 (Pt. II), at 18.  
210 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER 
CENTURY LATER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2011) (noting that although just 
35% of brand-name drugs had generic counterparts in 1984, nearly all brand-name drugs 
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Of course, Hatch-Waxman has been subject to gaming of various 
kinds, most notably around “reverse payment settlements” between 
originator firms and generics manufacturers.211  The Act grants a 180-day 
exclusivity period as an incentive to the first generic manufacturer who files 
and prevails in a Paragraph IV certification, in which the generic applicant 
avers that the patent on which the original drug is based is invalid or not 
infringed.  However, this exclusivity period is only triggered either when a 
court rules that the patent is invalid or not infringed or when the generic 
drug is first marketed.  As such, originator firms that settle with the 
Paragraph IV first filers prior to judgment may forestall the entrance of 
other generic competition by avoiding triggering the exclusivity period.  
These settlements have the potential to “exclude entry for longer than the 
expected litigation exclusion period, which would have reflected the often 
significant likelihood that the patent holder would have lost.”212  In its 2012 
Term, the Supreme Court held that this practice is subject to antitrust 
scrutiny under the rule-of-reason test.213 
Like the other statutes examined previously in this Article, public 
choice theory predicts that the Hatch-Waxman Act would be primarily 
motivated by interest group activity.  Indeed, because the Act targets an 
even smaller number of companies than does either the FCIA or Bayh-Dole 
(which apply broadly across technologies), the public choice collective 
action problem would seem to be even more exaggerated here.  That is, the 
pharmaceutical and generics industries should have little or no problem 
coming together to lobby for this statute (as its benefits would be even more 
concentrated), while the diffuse public will be unable to prevent its 
enactment.  Admittedly, the issue of patent terms for pharmaceuticals is 
likely of higher salience to the public than is judicial reform or university 
patenting, and thus we might expect consumer groups to oppose that portion 
of the legislation.  Yet the inclusion of the generic drug pathway in the 
enacted statute should placate consumer groups, particularly where the 
House Report on the subject concluded that the availability of generic drugs 
                                                                                                                       
have such counterparts today); but see Mossinghoff, supra note 201, at 187 (“[Hatch-
Waxman] was not a good deal [for the pharmaceutical industry], unless one believed that 
FDA was going to go forward with its plans to implement abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs) through regulation.”). 
211 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006).  
212 Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
283, 284–85 (2012). 
213 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
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for originator products approved after 1962 would save American 
consumers $920 million over twelve years.214 
Given the strength of this public choice theory prediction, it is 
therefore not surprising that the Hatch-Waxman Act strongly resembles the 
situation presented by the enactment of the various copyright laws, in that 
its passage seems to be primarily the product of interest group lobbying and 
negotiation.215  Yet the interest group compromise aspect of the Act’s 
passage is intriguing.  Specifically, the branded pharmaceutical industry 
was unable to obtain a statute solely focused on patent term restoration.  
Further, because the originator and generic firms had opposing viewpoints 
on the ultimate statute, a process of negotiation ensued beyond any that 
would have needed to occur in the copyright context.  The situation here is 
thus basically consistent with public choice theory when industry is 
conceived of broadly, but when the regulated parties are examined more 
closely, the situation becomes more complicated. 
III. EXPLANATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the standard public choice 
theory account of legislative enactment does not typically hold in the patent 
law space.  Examining three major patent-related statutes of the last several 
decades, none of the histories surrounding their enactments quite match the 
situation observed in copyright law, in which the regulated industries have 
repeatedly colluded to pass copyright term extensions or other laws that 
strengthen their rights, such as the DMCA. Instead, the history behind 
legislative enactments in patent law reveals a more complex taxonomy of 
interest group involvement.  In some cases, like with the FCIA, the relevant 
institution essentially does not even exist at the time the statute is passed, 
and joint executive-legislative cooperation propels the bill through the 
process.  In cases like the Bayh-Dole Act, the regulated parties existed and 
their voices were considered in the lead-up to the Act’s passage, but there is 
little historical evidence of a determinative role in the enactment of the 
statute. Moreover, the statute contains a range of concessions whose 
existence is inconsistent with the significant involvement predicted by 
public choice theory.  In still other cases, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
industry is clearly the primary driver of the legislation, but the presence of 
industry groups on both sides of the Act leads to compromise.  Yet in all 
three cases, a traditional public choice theory story explaining the 
enactment of the statute can be told—it simply lacks a grounding in reality.   
                                                
214 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 17 (1984). 
215 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
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The remainder of this Article seeks to answer some of the questions 
posed by these case studies.  In particular, this Part considers all three 
statutes together and identifies factors that might explain their enactment 
even in the absence of strong interest group pressure. It also suggests factors 
that might differentiate legislative enactments in the patent area, where the 
standard interest group account does not hold, from enactments in copyright 
law, where the account does hold.  This Part then elaborates on one example 
of how consumer groups might use the insights developed in this Article to 
their advantage.  Finally, this Part considers potential implications for 
public choice theory and intellectual property scholarship.  
A. Explanations for Patent Legislation 
Given that something more than pure interest group willpower was 
needed in each of the above cases to drive the passage of the statute in 
question, it is first important to determine what factor or factors provided 
the additional activation energy needed before enactment.  There are at least 
four potential factors to consider, and although the relationships between 
them are complex, they may have the potential to work synergistically to 
drive legislative action. 
Historical Context. — First and perhaps most obviously, the 
examples described in the previous Part may be direct results of the 
particular historical circumstances surrounding their enactment.  All three 
statutes percolated through Congress and the executive branch at nearly the 
same time.  In the post-World War II period, the advent of the National 
Science Foundation216 in 1950 and growth of the National Institutes of 
Health had “brought the U.S. federal government into extensive 
technological cooperation with private industry and universities.”217  But by 
the time of the Cold War, concerns about the United States’ ability to 
compete in the global market were at their height.218  American 
policymakers were conscious of “the success of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (‘MITI’) in coordinating the industrial 
strategy of Japan. Political and economic leaders everywhere were looking 
to see how they could encourage MITI-like sources of direction for 
                                                
216 The National Science Foundation’s establishment is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1861 
(2012). 
217 Scherer, supra note 142, at 180. 
218 See Gulbrandsen, supra note 169, at 1149 (“At the time, the United States was suffering 
from a slide into industrial irrelevance in an increasingly global marketplace.”); see also 
Meador, supra note 112, at 615 (“There was growing concern that the United States might 
be lagging behind other industrial nations and that steps should be taken to induce more 
innovation.”). 
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industrial strategy but without the invasiveness of central planning 
agencies.”219  Although the United States already had a “robust scientific 
infrastructure,” the idea was to “encourage an appropriate hand-off of 
scientific breakthroughs to the production and commercial sectors.”220   
Relatedly, in 1978 President Carter had “launched a major domestic 
policy review on industrial innovation” through the Advisory Committee on 
Industrial Innovation, which made a series of recommendations about 
alterations to innovation policies.221  Among the review’s ultimate 
recommendations were a Bayh-Dole-like suggestion that “commercial 
rights to government-supported research be transferred to the private 
sector”222 as well as a Hatch-Waxman-like suggestion of “patent term 
restoration for pharmaceuticals and any other product that required 
regulatory review,”223 a proposal supported by the Reagan 
Administration.224 
Taking a further step back and considering the enactment of these 
statutes in light of the broader legislative and regulatory climate, beyond 
that relating to innovation alone, is similarly instructive.  Specifically, these 
statutes were enacted against a larger backdrop of deregulation and 
privatization in issues regarding common carriers and public utilities.225  
For instance, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978226 aimed to “encourage, 
develop, and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive 
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air services.”227  
Regulation of these industries, which included railroads, airlines, and 
                                                
219 Massaro, supra note 160, at 1730; see also id. at 1731 (“[O]ne of the more well-known 
examples of the discontinuity is the video cassette recorder. Ampex and one or two other 
American firms developed the basic concepts. Japanese firms then refined the concepts, 
took their product to the consumer market, and subsequently blew the American 
manufacturers out of the water on their way to achieving world dominance in the personal 
electronics industry.”). 
220 Massaro, supra note 160, at 1731.  
221 Mossinghoff, supra note 201, at 188; see, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION, FINAL REPORT (1979). 
222 Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 1689. 
223 Mossinghoff, supra note 201, at 188; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 (Pt. II) at 3 (“Patent 
owners began to complain that the period of federal government regulatory review eroded 
the effective market life of their patents. This view was first formally voiced by President 
Carter’s Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation.”). 
224 Mossinghoff, supra note 201, at 188. 
225 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 507–08 
(1985).  
226 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
227 Id. 
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electric companies,228 was of course more stringent than general regulation 
of intellectual property.229  Yet given the contemporaneous nature of the 
debates over deregulation, the economic thinking behind these deregulatory 
impulses was surely in the minds of lawmakers in both the executive and 
legislative branches as they drafted these patent statutes, each of which has 
the effect of giving more power to private entities.  
The particular historical context of the time surely played some role 
in the enactment of the FCIA, Bayh-Dole Act, and Hatch-Waxman Act.  
What is unclear, however, is how large a role the historical context played.  
Daniel Meador suggests that the FCIA’s “confluence with what was 
referred to as ‘industrial innovations proposals’” from President Carter 
“carried [the Act] forward in the House, at least initially.”230  But how 
attributable this momentum was to the mood among Congressmen for 
ensuring American competitiveness or deregulating industry and how much 
to their respect for the considered proposals from the President is not clear.  
Legislative Entrepreneurship. — Second, certain policy problems 
may provide particularly robust opportunities for legislative 
entrepreneurship,231 in which Congressmen “invest time, staff, and other 
resources to acquire knowledge of particular policy areas, draft legislation 
addressing issues in those areas, and shepherd their proposals through the 
legislative process by building and maintaining coalitions.”232  As Daniel 
Meador phrased this concept in the executive branch context, “the extent to 
which the attorney general is successful in warding off improper political 
intrusions depends more than anything else on the character of the person 
holding the office.”233  From an economic perspective (and analogously to 
the logic underlying public choice theory), individual legislators should 
rarely if ever be incentivized to bear the costs of such investment 
themselves in any given policy area, as opposed to free riding on the efforts 
of other Congressmen.  However, empirical evidence234 suggests that 
legislators often are sufficiently motivated to advocate for change in patent-
related areas, such that interest group pressures take a backseat to concerns 
                                                
228 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 225, at 1327. 
229 For instance, although the government is the gatekeeper for the issuance of patents, it 
does not (generally) then tell patentees how much to charge for their goods or services.  
230 Meador, supra note 112, at 615.   
231 Robert A. Katzmann, Making Sense of Congressional Intent: Statutory Interpretation 
and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE L.J. 2345, 2361 (1995) (reviewing R. SHEP MELNICK, 
BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994)).  
232 GREGORY WAWRO, LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 2 (2001). 
233 Meador, supra note 85, at 539. 
234 See generally WAWRO, supra note 232. 
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about the public interest or reelection prospects.235  Henry Waxman’s 
central role in many of the most important health-related legislation of the 
1980s and 1990s, beyond even the cases discussed above, is certainly an 
example of this phenomenon.236   
Interest Group Alignment. — One factor potentially distinguishing 
statutory change in the copyright context from statutory change in the patent 
field is the character and positions of the various interest groups.  In the 
copyright context, the content creators are still essentially monolithic.237  
The RIAA, MPAA, and other related organizations have quite similar views 
about the kind and amount of protection they would like to receive for their 
members.  Their ability to stand united behind a given protection-increasing 
measure functionally increases the pressure on Congress and thus the 
likelihood that the measure will become law.238  But interest groups in 
patent law are more heterogeneous, with their perspectives on patent law 
dividing along (and even within) technological lines.  Pharmaceutical 
companies “rely heavily on the patent system to maximize the return on 
their considerable investment in new product development,” due to “the 
nature of small molecule chemistry and considerable expense of drug 
development,” while software firms “have less interest in long patent terms, 
as product cycles and dubious incentive function of patents make patents 
more likely to serve as obstacles than to provide incentives for 
innovation.”239  Empirical studies have borne out this divergence,240 but 
                                                
235 At least one study of the House of Representatives argued that without legislative 
entrepreneurship, “it is doubtful that the House could pass legislation.” Id. at 2. 
236 See generally HENRY WAXMAN, THE WAXMAN REPORT: HOW CONGRESS REALLY 
WORKS (2009) (discussing Representative Waxman’s involvement in the passage of the 
Ryan White Act, Orphan Drug Act, and Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, among 
others); see also id. at xii (“The other guys always have more money. That’s why Congress 
is so important. Run as it should be, it ensures that no special interest can ever be powerful 
enough to eclipse the public interest.”).  
237 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, American Corporate Copyright: A Brilliant, Uncoordinated 
Plan, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 489 (2005). 
238 To be sure, the views of the RIAA, MPAA, and other organizations are not precisely 
identical, and the character of the statute (see infra) has a key role to play in this area.  
Negotiation may still be required, Litman, Legislative History, supra note 42, at 862, but 
the parties in the copyright space are still far closer than are the parties in the patent space.  
239 Morriss & Nard, supra note 48, at 168 (2011); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 312 
(2003) (“Many highly progressive, research-intensive industries, notably including the 
computer software industry, do not rely heavily on patents as a method of preventing free 
riding on inventive activity.”). 
240 See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their 
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent 
(or Not) (2000) (NBER Working Paper 7552) (surveying different industries and finding 
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admittedly, it appears to be a relatively recent development241 and thus it 
cannot explain why the lack of such a conflict earlier in the twentieth 
century did not lead to more patent-protective legislation at that time. As an 
additional note, the fact that a given interest group is present or absent plays 
a critical role here: a statute establishing a formally absent interest group 
will likely never be explained on strong public choice grounds. 
Statutory Character. — A second factor distinguishing the patent 
and copyright contexts is the character and appearance of each statute.  
Specifically, the copyright statute contains many technology- and situation-
specific rules and exceptions, whereas the majority (although certainly not 
all242) of the patent statute is written in more general terms that formally 
apply across technologies.243  As Jessica Litman puts it, the copyright 
statute “seems on its face to have been drafted primarily for the benefit of 
people with ready access to copyright counsel. It is long, complicated, 
counterintuitive and highly specific.”244  Professors Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley opine that the “bloated, impenetrable” Copyright Act “reads like the 
tax code.”245  Burk and Lemley note the comparative simplicity of the 
patent statute246 and encourage patent law to avoid adopting the model used 
by the copyright statute, as “[t]echnology-specific patent legislation will 
encourage rent-seeking by those who stand to benefit from favorable 
legislation.”247  Of course, the Hatch-Waxman Act is one such technology-
specific statute.  
                                                                                                                       
that the pharmaceutical industry relies more heavily on patent rights than do other 
industries). 
241 Morriss & Nard, supra note 48, at 168 (“[I]n the late eighteenth and much of the 
nineteenth century, there were no such distinct industry-specific positions on patent law.”). 
242 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1637 & n.218 (listing sections).  
243 But see id. at 1577 (“[D]espite the appearance of uniformity, patent law is actually as 
varied as the industries it seeks to foster.”). 
244 Litman, Technological Change, supra note 42, at 23; see also Jessica Litman, The 
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 34 (1995) (“The current 
copyright statute weighs in at 142 pages.”).  
245 Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1638. 
246 Id. at 1637.  In fact, Burk and Lemley ascribe the patent statute’s simplicity at least in 
part to the interest group conflict articulated above.  Id. (“Patent law has some balance 
today in part because different industries have different interests, making it difficult for one 
interest group to push through changes to the statute.”).  The mechanism of action behind 
their supposition, however, is not clear.  Burk and Lemley do not explain how the interest 
group conflict in patent law prevents one interest group from enacting an interest-group-
specific protectionist measure like those seen in the context of copyright.  They do, though, 
explain why an expenditure of time on such efforts might be wasteful, given the pace of 
technological progress.  
247 Id. at 1637; see also id. (“Industry-specific legislation is much more vulnerable to 
industry capture.”). 
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The fact that public choice theory appears to hold weakly where the 
statute is phrased in general terms does not necessarily require that public 
choice theory will hold strongly where a statute is phrased in technology-
specific terms.  Yet, assuming that the various industry groups will be 
unable to convert the generally phrased patent statute into one more closely 
resembling the situation-specific copyright statute,248 these two factors 
might explain why there has been more legislative activity in copyright law 
as compared with patent law.  Particularly when considered together, it 
seems intuitive that protectionist measures in a context of monolithic 
interest groups and technology-specific statutes would both arise and 
succeed in their passage more often than in a context of sharp divisions 
within interest groups and a generally phrased statute.  Instead, though, 
interest group conflict over an issue and the precise character of a given 
statute may create room for political activity of various kinds, as described 
above. 
The foregoing is not merely an empty exercise in speculation: the 
four factors identified herein present testable hypotheses.  Although 
historical context is admittedly difficult to assess during a given moment in 
time, retrospective examinations of various patent statutes might seek to 
explain the process of their enactments as artifacts of a particular national 
mood.  The actions of Henry Waxman and other like-minded Congressmen 
also lend support to the legislative entrepreneurship factor. It is similarly 
unclear whether this factor may be predicted in advance, however—that is, 
we might be able to predict that different industries would take different 
perspectives on a proposed bill, but we might not be able to predict that any 
given (or even any) legislator would latch on to and promote that same bill.  
But the presence or absence of legislative entrepreneurship can at the very 
least be identified retrospectively. The confluence of the third and fourth 
factors might be studied in a comparative manner, as I alluded to above.  
Specifically, we would expect to see fewer, less extensive statutes enacted 
that achieve IP-protectionist purposes in fields where interest groups have 
diverging viewpoints about the substantive merits of any changes to the 
statute, particularly where the statute is framed in general terms that would 
force these incongruous interests to compromise, as compared to fields 
where interest groups are essentially united in their views and even then 
have the additional opportunity to customize their protection to their 
specifications, minimizing the need for negotiation and compromise.  Given 
the pace of copyright expansion over the past thirty years as compared to 
the pace of patent expansion, these factors seem to be based in reality.   
                                                
248 This may be a significant assumption.  See infra notes 266–267.  
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The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act249 (AIA) may present one 
such example for retrospective (though nearly contemporaneous) 
consideration of these factors.  From a historical perspective, the financial 
crisis and resurging fears about America’s global competitiveness may have 
helped catalyze the passage of the AIA, particularly where the interventions 
of patent scholars, industry, and a few Congressmen had failed previously.  
The general character of the legislation as largely procedural and as 
applying across industries, as well as the observed fault lines within and 
across industries, may have similarly helped.  At any rate, it appears that the 
AIA was the result of considered, thoughtful legislative action conducted in 
dialogue with the executive and judiciary, rather than of slavish adherence 
to interest groups.250  
From a predictive standpoint, another potential example might be 
the case of patent trolls.  Although efforts to curtail what practicing entities 
view as trolls’ abusive litigation practices have popped up in both the 
legislative and executive branches over the past decade or even more, 
attention to the issue may be reaching a critical mass.  President Obama has 
announced several executive orders designed to ameliorate the situation,251 
but they are not sufficient to solve it.  Congressmen have proposed a 
number of bills aiming to deter trolls, such as the Saving High-Tech 
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act (SHIELD)252 or the Patent 
Abuse Reduction Act,253 and one passed the House in December 2013 with 
wide bipartisan support.254  None have yet become law, however, and in 
May 2014 Senator Leahy removed the issue of troll reform from the 
congressional agenda.255  Still, here, the above four conditions would seem 
to be met, and thus legislative entrepreneurship might provide a sufficient 
                                                
249 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
250 See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: 
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2011); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of 
the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539 (2011). 
251 Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out “Patent Trolls,” N.Y. TIMES, 
June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-
patent-suits.html. 
252 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act, H.R. 6245, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
253 Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013).  
254 Edward Wyatt, House Bill Raises Bar for Suits Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/business/house-bill-raises-bar-for-suits-over-
patents.html.  
255 Edward Wyatt, Legislation to Protect Against “Patent Trolls” Is Shelved, N.Y. TIMES, 
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patent-trolls-is-shelved.html. 
49
Sachs: The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 344 (2014)  2013-2014  
393 
catalyst to push a helpful law through Congress.  Troll litigation harms 
consumers as well as practicing entities, most obviously by preventing 
consumers from accessing new products when start-ups are the target of the 
suits256 or by leading to increased prices when established companies 
externalize their litigation costs.  Although the software and hard 
technology industries have generally come out against trolls, other 
technological sectors where troll litigation is comparatively rare at this time 
(like biotechnology) may be indifferent, and powerful trolls will exert (and 
have exerted257) their own pressure on the other side of the law.   
Other questions regarding these factors still remain to be answered.  
Their effects should be isolated from each other and quantified, their 
interactions examined, and their prospective prediction capabilities 
assessed.  Determining their relative contributions to legislative action or 
inaction would bolster the predictive power of public choice analysis. 
B. Applying Systemic Irregularities to Achieve Patent Reform 
Part I of this Article presented Professor Amy Kapczynski’s 
contention that there is an “emerging countermobilization” to the 
strengthening of IP rights that has occurred over the last few decades.258  
This countermobilization has not yet included the enactment of IP-
weakening legislation by the United States Congress, and at least some 
scholars have questioned whether such efforts would even be possible.259  
But this Article is more optimistic, suggesting a way forward for those 
seeking to affirmatively make change and weaken patent rights where they 
result in the most negative societal consequences.260  By determining the 
valence of each of the four factors above in a given situation, advocates 
may be better able to target their interventions. 
Specifically, for the most effective results, advocates should target 
their intervention in the political process to situations involving proposed 
IP-weakening provisions in which 1) the contemporary context reflects 
                                                
256 David Segal, How a Typical Patent Battle Took an Unexpected Turn, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/how-a-typical-patent-battle-took-
an-unexpected-turn.html. 
257 See, e.g., Andrew Ramonas, Intellectual Ventures CEO Warns of Premature IP Reform, 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013, 03:33 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/intellectual-ventures-ceo-warns-of-premature-ip-
reform.html. 
258 Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 820. 
259 See Benkler, supra note 14, at 196. 
260 This Article’s insights into related efforts in the copyright space, unfortunately, will be 
less helpful due to the valence of factors two and three in that context. 
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concern about dangers to consumers or businesses, particularly those 
stemming from overprotection,261 2) feelings about the provision differ 
amongst interest groups, 3) the proposed provision is a general one 
affecting large swathes of industry, and 4) a motivated legislator will not 
only support the legislation but also steward its passage through Congress.  
The combination of the first three factors will effectively “make room” for 
legislative entrepreneurship and public interest groups to prevail.  As noted 
in the previous Section, legislation altering the ways in which nonpracticing 
entities proceed with litigation may be a ripe target for the involvement of 
consumer advocates. 
Advocates should be realistically optimistic about the potential 
opportunities this theory creates for consumer groups to have their voices 
heard by Congress.  It would be naïve to suggest that industry would 
somehow, magically, be unable to prevent the weakening of their IP, or that 
consumers would find it easy in any absolute sense to drive such legislation 
through Congress.  Ultimately, the FCIA and Bayh-Dole Acts were both 
pro-patent statutes, even though they were constructed with relatively little 
input from the relevant interest groups involved.   
C. Implications for Public Choice Theory and Intellectual 
Property Scholarship 
The above case study analysis also has implications for scholarship 
in public choice theory and intellectual property.  From a public choice 
theory standpoint, the recognition that public choice analysis should be 
deployed along a spectrum of interest group representation, in which 
interest groups are categorized not only by their presence or absence but 
also by their level of involvement in the legislation, can improve the 
precision with which public choice analyses are conducted.  In particular, 
the category of statutes involving absent interest groups is woefully 
underrepresented in the literature.262  Yet statutes creating entirely new 
interest groups are or at least should be among the most interesting, from a 
scholarly perspective, and these statutes would benefit from greater 
attention in the literature. 
This Article also has implications for the debate over public choice 
theory and the appropriate scope of judicial review in the context of 
                                                
261 See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Note, 
Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms to Follow-On Innovation, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1370 
(2013).  
262 See supra notes 74–78. 
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intellectual property legislation.263  If judges should be engaged in higher 
levels of scrutiny when examining statutes that appear to be simple 
protectionism, then the appropriate scope of review of copyright statutes 
may be quite different than the scope of review of patent statutes.  As one 
example, judicial expansion of the fair use doctrine might be justified, but 
perhaps judges should be more circumspect in examining similar defensive 
doctrines in patent law.  
Finally, an issue that deserves much more attention than I am able to 
give it in this Article is the potential involvement of the executive in this 
area of law.  Admittedly, executive involvement should be invoked 
cautiously.  It is possible that various industry stakeholders have made the 
rational choice not to commandeer the legislative process, anticipating 
public criticism, and have instead attempted to secure concessions through 
the passage of follow-on regulations to these various statutes.  One such 
example of this would be President Reagan’s 1983 extension of the Bayh-
Dole Act to large businesses by executive order.264 
But the potential for an engaged Office of the Chief Economist at 
the PTO or for the Office of Science and Technology Policy to be an 
additional, public-spirited source of policy should not be overlooked. 
Clearly, the executive branch played at least some role in the passage of 
each statute analyzed above, and it played a significant role in the FCIA and 
Bayh-Dole contexts.  Industry and Congress are not the only relevant actors 
anymore, and although the executive branch has historically served largely 
as a source of information about potential problems worthy of legislative 
action, it can do more.  This Article is far from the first to suggest a broader 
policymaking role for the executive in the patent arena,265 but it does 
provide examples of ways in which the executive and Congress might 
engage in productive policy dialogue.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis has challenged the conventional wisdom in 
the intellectual property literature. I have argued that public choice theory 
cannot explain the enactment of several important patent-related statutes.  
To be sure, this analysis is far from complete.  Certain pseudo-patent 
statutes like the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984266 or the Plant 
                                                
263 See supra notes 22–24. 
264 See supra note 177. 
265 See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 25. 
266 Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2012)). 
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Variety Protection Act of 1970267 and individual patent extension laws268 
suggest that Congress is certainly capable of protecting particular industries.  
But the statutes that are most often referred to as expanding patentees’ 
rights—the FCIA, the Bayh-Dole Act, and the Hatch-Waxman Act—cannot 
be so easily explained by public choice analysis.  In categorizing interest 
group activity in the patent space and inductively establishing particular 
factors that might explain the pattern of legislation observed in this area, 
this Article sought to provide insight for consumers and scholars alike.  For 
consumers looking to counter the seemingly inexorable slide toward ever-
increasing patent protections of various kinds, this taxonomy and list of 
factors might have predictive value in permitting them to concentrate 
lobbying efforts in areas where they might have the greatest potential of 
actually effecting change.  And for scholars of public choice theory and 
intellectual property law, this analysis suggests not only refinements to the 
public choice analysis, but also a new way to think about the legislative 
process for patent scholars. 
                                                
267 Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
268 See generally Richard M. Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
59 (1993).  
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